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INTRODUCTION
Securities markets have long employed "gatekeepers"-independent
professionals who pledge their reputational capital-to protect the interests of
dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action.' The clearest
examples of such reputational intermediaries are auditors and securities
analysts, who verify or assess corporate disclosures in order to advise investors
in different ways. But during the late 1990s, these protections seemingly
failed, and a unique concentration of financial scandals followed, all involving
the common denominator .of accounting irregularities. What caused this
sudden outburst of scandals, involving an apparent epidemic of accounting and
related financial irregularities, that broke over the financial markets between
late 2001 and mid-2002--e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Tyco, and
others? To date, much commentary has broadly and loosely attributed these
scandals to any or all of a number of circumstances: (1) a stock market bubble;
(2) a decline in business morality; (3) weak boards of directors;2 or (4) an
I Probably the first systematic use of this term, "gatekeeper," was in an article by Ronald
Gilson and Ranier Kraakman. See Ronald J. Gilson & Ranier H. Kraakman, The
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613-21 (1984) (discussing the role of
investment bankers as gatekeepers). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The
Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1210-13,
1232-33 (1999) (discussing the role of underwriters, accountants, lawyers, and directors as
"gatekeepers" and "reputational intermediaries"). For a fuller discussion of the concept of
gatekeepers as "reputational intermediaries," see infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
The use of such private agents substantially predates the appearance of public regulation,
either the federal securities laws or the state "Blue Sky" laws. The New York Stock
Exchange began to require the publication of financial statements certified by an
independent auditor around 1900, well before the passage of the first "Blue Sky" statute.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State
in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 37-39 (2001).
2 For a representative such statement, see Stuart L. Gillan & John D. Martin, Financial
Engineering, Corporate Governance and the Collapse of Enron 3 (2002) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=354040 (last
accessed Mar. 12, 2004) (finding that the first cause of Enron's breakdown was "a lack of
board independence and board oversight"). In contrast, this article doubts the adequacy of
such an explanation. Admittedly, boards did fail, and even a special committee of Enron's
own board has concluddd that the Enron board failed to adequately monitor officers for
conflicts of interest. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP., Feb. 1,
2002, available at 2002 WL 198018 (describing the board's failure to monitor for conflict
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increase in "infectious greed."'3 Without denying that any of these factors
could have played some role, this article begins from the premise that
explanations phrased in terms of greed and morality are unsatisfactory because
they depend on subjective trends that cannot be reliably measured.
Even explanations that involve critiques of corporate governance involve a
related problem in that they fail to account for the sudden increase in financial
irregularity. While some boards certainly failed, the overall independence and
power of outside directors has only increased over recent years, and the 2001-
2002 epidemic of financial irregularity cannot be satisfactorily explained in
terms of any recent decline in board performance. To explain an epidemic of
irregularity, one must identify some force or factor that changed-either
intensifying or weakening-so that its influence can account for the overall
shift in behavior. Clearly, the performance of boards of directors of publicly
held corporations, even if inadequate, did not decline materially over the
relevant interval of the 1990s.
A final over-simple explanation is that a "few bad apples"-i.e., a small
group of "rogue managers" who were corrupt-caused these scandals. This
explanation overlooks the pervasiveness of the sudden surge in financial
irregularities in the late 1990s. As will be seen, approximately ten percent of
all publicly listed U.S. companies restated their financial statements at least
once between 1997 and June 2002, 4 and the annual rate of financial
restatements soared during the latter half of the 1990s.5  Such financial
irregularity is, of course, characteristic of a bubble, and little doubt now exists
that a large frothy bubble burst in 2000-2001. As a historical matter, bubbles
tend to produce scandals and, in turn, prophylactic legislation,6 but this loose
of interest regarding a number of major transactions and business relationships). Similarly,
a Senate Subcommittee has assigned the principal blame to the Enron board. See
PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMM. OF GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE
ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN ENRON'S COLLAPSE, S. REP. No. 107-70, at 60 (2001)
("By failing to provide sufficient oversight and restraint to stop management excess, the
Enron Board contributed to the company's collapse and bears a share of the responsibility
for it."). Nonetheless, such studies beg the larger question: why did these boards fail now
and not earlier? Although board procedure or independence may have been deficient, they
were almost certainly superior to a decade ago when such scandals were rare.
I Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan coined this colorful phrase, saying that "An
infectious greed seemed to grip much of our business community." Floyd Norris, The
Markets: Market Place: Yes, He Can Top That, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2002, at Al.
4 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, U.S. SENATE, FINANCIAL STATEMENT RESTATEMENTS:
TRENDS, MARKET IMPACTS, REGULATORY RESPONSES AND REMAINING CHALLENGES 4 (2002)
[hereinafter GAO STUDY] ("From January 1997 through June 2002, about 10 percent of all
listed companies announced at least one restatement.").
See infra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
6 Professor Stuart Banner has argued that, over the last 300 years, most major instances
of legislation regulating the securities markets have followed a sustained price collapse on
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generalization leaves unanswered the critical questions: what caused this
bubble and how does the growth of a bubble relate to the apparent breakdown
of our once-confident system of corporate governance?
This article will focus on an alternative explanation for the wave of
accounting and financial reporting irregularities that surfaced in 2001-2002:
namely, that the gatekeepers failed. That is, the professionals who serve
investors by preparing, verifying, or certifying corporate disclosures to the
securities markets acquiesced in managerial fraud-not in all cases, to be sure,
but at a markedly higher rate than during the immediately preceding period.
While the concept of gatekeeper will be discussed and refined later, this term
certainly includes the auditors, securities analysts, and securities attorneys who
prepare, review, or analyze disclosure documents. Part I of this article
develops competing, but complimentary, explanations for gatekeeper failure.
The behavior of gatekeepers cannot be examined in isolation, but rather
appears to have been significantly influenced by the incentives that drove
corporate managers over the same period. To this extent, the recent explosion
of financial irregularity was less the product of ineffable factors-such as
"infectious greed" or mass irrationality-than the natural and logical
consequence of trends and forces that had been developing for some time.
Ironically, the blunt truth is that both the recent accounting scandals and the
broader phenomenon of earnings management were the by-products of a
system of corporate governance that has indeed made corporate managers
more accountable to the market. Sensitivity to the market, however, can be a
mixed blessing-particularly when the market becomes euphoric and
uncritical. As a result, a corporate governance system that was adequate for a
world in which the agents' incentives to act opportunistically were weaker
failed when these same agents-managers, gatekeepers, and financial
intermediaries-responded to stronger incentives and rationally pursued their
own self-interests to the detriment of shareholders.
Part I will conclude that the factor that most destabilized our contemporary
corporate governance system was the sudden change in executive compen-
sation during the 1990s. As executive compensation shifted to being equity-
based, instead of cash-based, a greatly enhanced incentive arose for managers
to manipulate earnings-and to induce their gatekeepers to let them. To this
extent, blaming the board is a myopic theory of causation that leads nowhere
because it does not explain the sudden surge in irregularities. In truth, in most
cases, boards cannot detect earnings manipulation in the absence of warnings
from their professional gatekeepers.
This focus on executive compensation as the destabilizing force that led
managers to overreach gatekeepers is subject to a contextual qualification:
gatekeepers do not have the same economic or legal relationship to corporate
managements around the world. Outside the United States, no similar outburst
the securities market. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300
Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
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of accounting irregularities or financial statement restatements occurred during
2000 to 2002, even though stock markets receded uniformly in the United
States and Europe. Indeed, most of the non-U.S. companies that did
experience accounting irregularities over this same era either had significant
U.S. operations where the fraud originated or also relied on stock options to
compensate senior management. Across most of the world, however, little use
is made of equity compensation because most firms have concentrated
ownership and their controlling shareholders do not need to rely on equity
compensation to align shareholder interests with their own. Thus, the relative
absence of accounting scandals in Europe over the 2000-2002 period, coupled
with the limited use of equity compensation in Europe, tends to corroborate the
basic hypothesis advanced in Part I that changes in executive compensation
destabilized American corporate governance.
Still, accounting scandals have recently surfaced in Europe, most notably in
the case of Parmalat. 7 Part I finds that these scandals were qualitatively
different than Enron and WorldCom in several respects. These scandals
demonstrate that gatekeeper failure is a worldwide problem, but one that has
different causes and cures depending upon the different structures of corporate
governance involved.
Although Part I offers a diagnosis, it proposes no prescription, in part
because effective prescriptions must be context-specific and not universal.
Part II approaches the task of prescription by first mapping the range of
strategies available to regulators. Basically, it groups the realistic regulatory
options for dealing with conflicts of interest under four headings: (1) structural
rules, which, for example, subject gatekeepers to greater public oversight; (2)
prophylactic rules, which typically seek to preclude conflicts of interest; (3)
"empowerment" rules, which seek to assure greater independence or to give
the gatekeeper greater leverage over the principal that it is expected to monitor;
and (4) liability-enhancing rules. Seeking to curb the conflicts of interest that
compromised auditors and analysts, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,8 passed
by Congress in response to the wave of corporate scandals that crested in 2002,
utilizes all these strategies-except the last. Although enhancing liability rules
is probably the most obvious and traditional response to scandals, this was also
the one strategy that business interests effectively resisted during the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley. Ironically, even though Congress has not used
this technique, Part II finds that courts in today's "post-Enron" environment
appear to be enhancing the risk of legal liability on their own through the
creative reinterpretation of ambiguous doctrines.
7 See Mark Landler, Scandal Outrages Europeans; Solutions May Be Patchwork, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 25, 2003, at CI (discussing Parmalat and other recent European accounting
scandals).
8 Technically, this statute is entitled the "Public Company Accounting Reform and
Investor Protection Act of 2002." 107 Pub. L. No. 204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 7201).
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But therein lies a host of problems. Although gatekeepers need to face some
legal threat if they are to remain faithful to shareholders, the optimal level of
deterrence is much harder to estimate. Some recent commentators have
proposed a strict liability regime for gatekeepers, arguing that only strict
liability provides gatekeepers with optimal incentives to prevent client
misconduct.9 Other commentators have disagreed, replying that strict liability
may cause the market for gatekeepers to fail or may simply deny some law-
abiding, but higher risk, issuers access to the capital markets.' 0 Although the
magnitude of the litigation "threat" that is now facing gatekeepers can
reasonably be debated and probably varies with the type of gatekeeper, the
increasing risk of gatekeeper insolvency in at least the U.S. context suggests
the need to consider alternative reforms that can modify gatekeeper behavior
by means that do not directly threaten gatekeeper solvency.
In this light, Part III proposes alternative reforms intended both to introduce
a new gatekeeper into the disclosure process and to make existing gatekeepers
more responsive to the interests of investors. Initially, Part III proposes a
modified form of strict liability for auditors that caps their maximum exposure
at a multiple of their expected revenues from the client. The attraction of this
combination is that it combines the superior incentives of a strict liability
regime -with both reduced transaction costs (as courts are spared the costly
obligation of determining when gatekeepers acted with scienter or without
reasonable care) and a reduced risk of gatekeeper insolvency or market failure
in the market for gatekeeper services. Similarly, the prospect that law-abiding
issuers might be denied access to the capital markets because of the liability
risk they posed to their gatekeepers is also alleviated. Concededly, this
proposal does subordinate the goal of victim compensation to that of
deterrence, but gatekeepers simply lack the economic scale to be able to fund
significant compensation to investors, particularly in the new era of mega-
litigation. Finally, by moving towards a strict liability system, this proposal
eliminates the incentive for auditors to rationalize or overlook fraud or
irregularity and later assert, on its discovery, that they were deceived by
management. Rather, the auditor would know that it sinks or swims with its
client; hence, half-hearted or pro forma monitoring, which may be a rational
strategy under a negligence or fault-based legal regime, no longer protects the
gatekeeper.
Part III recognizes, however, that all gatekeepers are not alike, that strict
9 See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace ", 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993 (1994) (proposing strict liability for internet service providers); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers? A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 491 (2001).
10 Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 53 (2003). Professor Reinier
Kraakman has also warned that strict gatekeeper liability may be undesirable. See Reinier
Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 53, 76 (1986).
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liability only makes sense when the gatekeeper can effectively prevent client
misconduct, and that the attorney is not as well positioned as the auditor to
detect client misconduct. In that light, Part III does not propose strict liability
for attorneys but, instead, a structural reform: namely, imposing gatekeeper
responsibilities on attorneys to monitor their corporation's disclosures, with a
special emphasis on non-financial disclosures. The goal here is to empower
the gatekeeper and increase its leverage with respect to its client. To achieve
this goal, Part III proposes that the attorney should be given a limited
responsibility for non-financial disclosures functionally corresponding to those
the auditor now has for financial disclosures. Easy as this is to say, the devil
lies in the details. Specifically, Part III outlines a "negative assurance"
certification requirement, an enhanced independence standard for special
contexts, and a due diligence obligation under which the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") could suspend or disbar securities attorneys
who failed negligence or malpractice tests. To be sure, the SEC has already
begun to move modestly and tentatively in this same direction by adopting an
"up-the-ladder" internal reporting requirement under which attorneys must
report evidence of certain material violations of law that they acquire in their
representation of the corporation to the corporation's general counsel or, if
necessary, its audit committee. 1 The SEC is also considering, and a number
of academics have urged, a further reform under which the attorney would be
required to make a "noisy withdrawal" if the violation continued and
threatened serious injury to the corporation.' 2  Without disputing the
justifications for such a broader rule, Part III predicts that only modest benefits
can be expected from such a reform because it demands heroism from the
attorney on rare and isolated occasions without resting its obligation on a
broader functional foundation. In contrast, certification requirements create
the broader framework within which the attorney must function on an on-going
basis as a gatekeeper.
Of course, any claim that the attorney is, or should be, a gatekeeper, will
trigger predictable responses from the bar that such a role conflicts with the
other roles that attorneys perform or that it will dry up the flow of information
between attorneys and clients. Part III assesses and rejects these arguments,
concluding that the principal consequence of expressly recognizing attorneys
as gatekeepers will be instead to enhance their leverage with their clients. In
short, the unrecognized consequence of expanded ethical or professional
l See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt.
205) (requiring that, as a minimum standard of professional conduct, attorneys must "report
evidence of a material violation of securities law.., to the chief legal counsel or the chief
executive officer ... (or the equivalent thereof)"). See also infra notes 126-130 and
accompanying text.
12 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8186, 79 S.E.C. Docket 1392 (Jan. 29, 2003).
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obligations is to empower the gatekeeper, thus responding appropriately to the
phenomenon of "gatekeeper failure."
I. GATEKEEPERS: PAST AND PRESENT
A. Defining the Concept
The term "gatekeeper" has been widely used to refer to the outside
professionals who serve the board or investors. 13 Broadly as the term may be
sometimes used, two core elements underlie the concept of gatekeeper, and it
is important to distinguish between them. First, the gatekeeper is a person who
has significant reputational capital, acquired over many years and many
clients, which it pledges to assure the accuracy of statements or representations
that it either makes or verifies. Second, the gatekeeper receives a far smaller
benefit or payoff for its role, as an agent, in approving, certifying, or verifying
information than does the principal from the transaction that the gatekeeper
facilitates or enables. For example, the founders of an issuer seeking to effect
an initial public offering may each expect $100 million if the offering is
successful; hence, they have incentives to misrepresent material facts that may
make them virtually undeterrable. In contrast, the firm's auditors probably
expect a much smaller payoff and have considerable reputational capital at
risk. Thus, because of this lesser benefit, the gatekeeper is easier to deter.
This latter premise applies even if the gatekeeper has little or no reputational
capital. These two elements-that the gatekeeper is a reputational
intermediary and that it receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in
misconduct-suggest a strategy for law compliance: the more the law makes
the involvement of gatekeepers in sensitive transactions mandatory, the more it
acquires a lever by which it can effectively discourage law violations.
To be sure, the term "gatekeeper" has also been used more broadly to
describe any person or entity who provides a necessary service or certification
without which the corporation cannot accomplish a transaction. 14 This may
13 The SEC regularly uses this term. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 33-7870, 72 S.E.C. Docket 1901
(June 30, 2000) (noting that "the federal laws... make independent auditors 'gatekeepers'
to the public securities markets"); see also Securities Act Concepts and Their Effects of
Capital Formation, Securities Act Release No. 33-7314, 61 Fed. Reg. 148 (July 25, 1996)
(discussing the role of gatekeepers in maintaining the quality of disclosure). Professor
Kraakman has defined gatekeepers as "private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by
withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers." Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53. Assaf
Hamdani uses a similarly broad definition, describing them as "parties who sell a product or
service that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in
particular services." Hamdani, supra note 10, at 58.
4 Professor Kraakman originally defined "gatekeepers" simply in terms of their blocking
capacity as private parties who are able to prevent misconduct by withholding their
cooperation from wrongdoers. See Kraakman, supra note 10, at 53; Reinier Kraakman,
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accurately describe their organizational position, but it seems overly broad
because it ignores both the deterrent capacity of the gatekeeper and whether it
possesses reputational capital. Under this broader definition, Microsoft might
become a "gatekeeper" for most of the business world (on the assumption that
its basic Windows technology was indispensable). Thus, this article will use
the term "gatekeeper" more narrowly to mean a reputational intermediary who
provides verification or certification services to investors. Still, the focus on
the gatekeeper's role in providing a necessary service or certification is useful
because it suggests a regulatory strategy on which this article will focus: by
mandating gatekeepers, the law can maximize the probability of deterrence by
creating a necessary actor, whose compliance with the law it can more
effectively influence.
Obvious examples of gatekeepers who provide such verification or
certification services would include: (1) the auditor providing its certification
of the issuer's financial statements; (2) the debt rating agency certifying the
issuer's creditworthiness (or relative creditworthiness); (3) the security analyst
providing its objective assessment of the corporation's technology,
competitiveness, or earnings prospects; (4) the investment banker providing its
"fairness opinion" as to the pricing of a merger; and (5) the securities attorney
for the issuer providing its opinion to the underwriters that all material
information of which it is aware concerning the issuer has been properly
disclosed. The underwriter in an initial public offering is probably also a
gatekeeper in the sense that its reputation is implicitly pledged and it is
expected to perform due diligence services. Some professions (most notably,
the auditor) provide services that consist primarily of gatekeeping, whereas
other professions engage in such services only as an ancillary activity (for
example, as discussed later, the attorney is primarily an advocate or a
transaction engineer and only sometimes a gatekeeper).
Characteristically, the professional gatekeeper essentially assesses or
vouches for the corporate client's own statements about itself or a specific
transaction. This duplication is desired because the market recognizes that the
gatekeeper has a lesser incentive to deceive than does its client and thus
regards the gatekeeper's assurance or evaluation as more credible.
Unavoidably, the gatekeeper as a watchdog is compromised to a degree by the
fact that it is typically paid by the party that it is to monitor. Still, the
gatekeeper's relative credibility stems from the fact that it in effect pledges a
reputational capital that it has built up over many years of performing similar
services for numerous clients. In theory, the gatekeeper as an entity would not
Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984);
see also Hamdani, supra note 10, at 58. This definition strikes me as overly broad, at least
for purposes of discussing the role of professionals. It would potentially hold liable persons
who sold pencils to Al Capone's gang on the theory that one could not run a brewery and
tavern business without using pencils to keep records. Ignored by this definition is whether
the gatekeeper possessed the ability to monitor whether its product or service has been
misused.
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rationally sacrifice its reputational capital for a single client or a modest fee.
Nonetheless, here as elsewhere, logic and experience can conflict. Despite
the clear logic of the gatekeeper rationale, reliance on gatekeepers can prove to
have been misplaced for any of the following reasons:
(1) A sudden decline in the deterrent threat facing gatekeepers could
occur, thereby increasing their willingness to take legal risks;
(2) The inducements offered to gatekeepers to breach their duties could
similarly be increased, with the same likely result;
(3) The value of their reputational capital could decline, possibly because
investors came to undervalue gatekeeping services in a "bubble
market";
(4) The prospective injury to a gatekeeper's reputational capital from
involvement in a scandal could also decline, possibly because, in a
very concentrated market (such as the market for auditing services), it
becomes foreseeable that all the principal firms in the market will be
involved in some scandals and hence investors cannot distinguish
meaningfully among them (i.e., the information costs become too
high for ordinary investors); and
(5) Principal/agent problems can arise within gatekeeper firms with the
result that agents can rationally decide to risk the firm's reputational
capital to a degree that the firm as a whole would not. This decision
to risk reputational capital that primarily belongs to others may be
rational for the agent, but not for the firm.
For all these reasons, professional gatekeepers may sometimes acquiesce in
managerial fraud, even though the apparent reputational losses seem to dwarf
the gains to be made from the individual client. 15
Much evidence corroborates each of the foregoing hypotheses and suggests
that reputational capital was knowingly risked and arguably even expended by
gatekeepers during the late 1990s. Indeed, Arthur Andersen's fall in 2002
seems best understood in terms of such a rational risk-taking explanation. In
theory, Andersen should not have acquiesced in accounting irregularities
because it had many clients, each of whom pay a fee that was modest in
proportion to the firm's overall revenues. Specifically, Arthur Andersen had
approximately 2300 audit clients.' 6 On this basis, the firm seemingly had little
incentive to risk its considerable reputational capital for any one client, even if
'1 This observation is hardly original with this author. See, e.g., Robert A. Prentice, The
Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight Into Securities Fraud Litigation, 95
Nw. U. L. REv. 1333 (2000) (rejecting the economic behavior assumption that loss of
reputation will prevent auditors from ever committing fraud).
16 Michelle Mittelstadt, Andersen Charged With Obstruction, Vows to Fight, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Mar. 15, 2002, at 1 (stating that Arthur Andersen had 2300 publicly held
auditing clients)
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that client paid a multi-million dollar fee. As will be seen, however, each of
the foregoing hypotheses can contribute to an explanation of gatekeeper
failure.
Nonetheless, during the 1990s, many courts bought hook, line, and sinker
the logic that gatekeepers do not acquiesce in misconduct. For example, in
DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 17 Judge Easterbrook, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
outlined precisely the foregoing theory:
The complaint does not allege that [the auditor] had anything to gain from
any fraud by [its client]. An accountant's greatest asset is its reputation
for honesty, closely followed by its reIputation for careful work. Fees for
two years' audits could not approach' the losses [that the auditor] would
suffer from a perception that it would muffle a client's fraud .... [The
auditor's] partners shared none of the gain from any fraud and were
exposed to a large fraction of the loss. It would have been irrational for
any of them to have joined cause with [the client].18
Of course, the modest fees in some of these cases were well under the $100
million in prospective annual fees from Enron that Arthur Andersen & Co.
explicitly foresaw.' 9 But this difference in magnitude cannot really explain
Arthur Andersen's collapse. Even if Arthur Andersen saw Enron as a potential
$100 million client, it must be remembered that Arthur Andersen generated
over $9 billion in revenues in 2001 alone (so that its expected Enron revenues
would total only around 1% of its aggregate revenues). 20 Hence, a more
nuanced explanation seems necessary.
B. The Auditing Profession During the 1990s: A Study in Transition
Once among the most respected of all professional service firms (including
law, accounting, and consulting firms), Andersen became involved in a series
of now well-known securities frauds-e.g., Waste Management, Sunbeam,
HBOCMcKesson, The Baptist Foundation, and Global Crossing-that
culminated in its disastrous association with Enron. Those who wish to view
the recent corporate scandals as simply the work of a "few bad apples" may
seek to characterize Arthur Andersen as a deviant firm, in effect an "outlaw"
that masqueraded as an honest sheriff. This theory, however, simply does not
17 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990). Accord Melder v. Morris, 27 F.3d 1097, 1103 (5th Cir.
1994); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a
mere $90,000 annual audit fee would have been an irrational motive for fraud).
1 See Dileo, 901 F.2d at 629.
'9 For example, the audit fee was only $90,000 in Robin v. Arthur Young & Co. See
Robin, 915 F.2d at 1127.
20 Arthur Andersen's total revenues for its fiscal year ending August 31, 2001 were $9.3
billion. See Melissa Klein, Guilty Verdict Draws Mixed Reactions: Profession Mulls Post-
Andersen Future, ACCT. TODAY, July 8, 2002, at 1. On this basis, even a projected $100
million in total fees from Enron would come to only slightly over 1% of Andersen's total
revenues.
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hold water. The available evidence in fact suggests that, in terms of the
percentage of accounting restatements experienced by its audit clients,
Andersen was not significantly different from its peers and experienced the
same (or lesser) rate of financial restatements. 21 To the extent it was different,
the leading difference may have been only that it was less lucky. All in all, the
more logical inference to draw from the "accounting irregularity" scandals of
2001-2002 is that an erosion in the quality of financial reporting occurred
sometime during the 1990s.
Indeed, this is the area where the data seems the clearest. During the 1990s,
earnings restatements, long recognized as a proxy for fraud, suddenly soared.
One study, conducted in 2001 by Moriarty and Livington, found that the
number of earnings restatements by publicly held corporations averaged 49 per
year from 1990 to 1997, next increased to 91 in 1998, and then skyrocketed to
150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 22 A later, fuller study conducted
by the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO") in October 2002,
examined all financial statement restatements (not just earnings restatements)
and also found a similarly sharp, discontinuous spike in 1999 that has
continued through 2002.23 The GAO study's data shows the trend line
presented in Figure 1.24
Not all restatements, however, are equal. Some may involve small,
infrequently traded companies or involve only trivial changes or trigger only
modest stock price reactions, while others may be on a scale with Enron or
WorldCom. Therefore, it is useful to focus more precisely on financial
statement restatements by companies listed on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq,
thereby excluding smaller companies that trade only on regional exchanges or
over the counter. On this basis, between 1997 and 2001, the proportion of
listed companies on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq that restated their financial
statement approximately tripled, increasing from less than 0.89% in 1997 to
21 Compared to its peers within the Big Five accounting firms, Arthur Andersen appears
to have been responsible for less than its proportionate share of earnings restatements.
While it audited 21% of Big Five audit clients, it was responsible for only 15% of the
restatements experienced by the Big Five firms between 1997 and 2001. On this basis, it
was arguably slightly more conservative than its peers. See Periscope: How Arthur
Andersen Begs for Business, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 18, 2002, at 6. In discussions with industry
insiders, the only respect in which I have ever heard Andersen characterized as different
from its peers in the Big Five was that it marketed itself as a firm in which the audit partner
could make the final call on difficult accounting questions without having to secure
approval from senior officials within the firm. Although this could translate into a weaker
system of internal controls, this hypothesis seems inconsistent with Arthur Andersen's
apparently below average rate of earnings restatements.
22 See George B. Moriarty & Phillip B. Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality
of Financial Reporting, 17 FIN. EXECUTIVE 53, 54 (July/Aug. 2001) (detailing the
chronological rise in earnings restatements by publicly held corporations).
23 See GAO Study, supra note 4, at 4-5.
24 Id. at 15.
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approximately 2.5% in 2001.25 Indeed, the GAO study further predicted that
this percentage would reach nearly 3% in 2002.26 Overall, the GAO study
found that from January 1997 to June 2002 approximately "10 percent of all
listed companies announced at least one restatement." 27 Also noteworthy was
the fact that the size (in terms of market capitalization) of the typical restating
company rose rapidly over this period,28 and in 2002, companies listed on the
NYSE or Nasdaq accounted for over 85% of all restatements identified in that
year.29
In theory, financial restatements could simply be the product of changes in
regulatory rules and could signify relatively little. But any possibility that
issuers are indifferent to restatements can quickly be dispelled. In the real
world, issuers resist restatements because they fear that stock price drops,
securities class actions, and SEC investigations generally follow in the wake of
financial statement restatements. Indeed, the GAO study found that stock
prices of restating companies over the 1997 to 2001 period suffered an
immediate market-adjusted decline of almost 10% on average, measured on the
basis of the stock's three day price movement from the trading day before the
25 Id. at 4 ("The proportion of listed companies on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq identified
as restating their financial reports tripled from less than 0.89 percent in 1997 to about 2.5
percent in 2001 .... ").
26 Id. ("The proportion of listed companies on NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq identified as
restating their financial reports ... may reach almost 3 percent by the end of 2002.").
27 Id.
28 Specifically, "[t]he average (median) size by market capitalization of a restating
company rose from $500 million ($143 million) in 1997 to $2 billion ($351 million) in
2002." Id.
29 Of the 125 actual restatements identified through mid-2002, 54 were listed on Nasdaq,
and 53 were listed on the NYSE (for a total of 107 or 85%). Id.
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announcement through the trading day after the announcement. 30 Between
1997 and 2002, restating firms lost over $100 billion in market capitalization
just over this three trading day period surrounding a restatement
announcement. 31 Given these significant and adverse stock price effects, it is
implausible to read the sharp increase in restatements at the end of the 1990s as
the product of any new tolerance for, or indifference to, restatements. Even if
(as some audit firms have contended) some portion of the change might be
attributed to new SEC pronouncements or, more generally, to SEC activism
about earnings management," 32 which became an SEC enforcement priority by
1998, 33 this explanation cannot carry us very far. Although SEC activism
might trigger some increase in the number of restatements, it cannot explain
the growth in the magnitude of restatements or the sharp stock price decline
(averaging 10%) on their announcement. 34 "Technical" restatements, made
simply to comply with new SEC interpretations, should not produce these
stock price reactions. Clearly, such reactions show that the market was
surprised.
The available data shows that, during the late 1990s, the magnitude of
financial restatements increased, both in absolute terms (nearly doubling) and
as a percentage of the issuer's rapidly increasing market capitalization. 35 This
30 Id. at 5. The GAO study also found a longer-term market-adjusted decline of 18%
over the period from sixty trading days before the announcement to sixty trading days after
the announcement. Id. at 29.
31 Id. at 34 (reporting that these market losses ranged from "$4.6 billion in 1997 to about
$28.7 billion in 2000," but acknowledging the difficulty of controlling for other factors that
may have affected stock prices for restating companies during the three day period).
32 Accounting firms have sometimes attempted to explain this increase in restatements on
the basis that the SEC tightened the definition of materiality in the late 1990s. This
explanation is not very convincing, in part because the principal SEC statement that
tightened the definition of materiality-Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99-was issued in
mid-1999, after the number of restatements had already begun to soar in 1998. Also, the
bulletin did not truly mandate restatements, but only advised that any rule of thumb
employed by auditors and issuers that assumed that amounts under 5% were inherently
immaterial could not be applied reflexively. See Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed.
Reg. 45150 (Aug. 19, 1999).
33 The SEC's prioritization of earnings management as a principal enforcement target
can be approximately dated to SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt's now famous speech on the
subject in 1998. See SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt, The "Numbers Game", Remarks at the
N.Y.U. Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at
http://www.corpforms99.com/205.html (last accessed Mar. 12, 2004).
31 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
35 According to Moriarty and Livingston, companies that restated earnings suffered
market losses of $17.7 billion in 1998, $24.2 billion in 1999, and $31.2 billion in 2000.
Moriarty & Livingston, supra note 22, at 55 (highlighting the large portion of the total
market value lost by a small number of restating companies). Expressed as a percentage of
the overall capitalization of the market (which was ascending hyperbolically over this
period), these losses for 1998 through 2000 came to 0.13%, 0.14% and 0.19%, respectively,
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suggests that managers became progressively willing over this period to take
greater risks. Moreover, as the decade of the 1990s wore on, earnings
restatements were increasingly experienced by large, mature, publicly-held
firms, rather than by smaller or newly public companies that might be expected
to be more inexperienced or rash. Managerial behavior within the largest firms
then seems to have changed over this period.
In particular, the GAO study's data corroborates this interpretation that
managerial behavior changed because it shows a significant change in motive.
Although there are many reasons why a company may restate its financial
statements (e.g., to adjust costs or expenses or to recognize liabilities), one
particular reason dominated during the period from 1997 to 2002. The GAO
study found that issues involving revenue recognition accounted for almost
39% of the 919 announced restatements that it identified over the 1997 to 2002
period. 36 In effect, attempts by management to prematurely recognize income
appear to have been the most common cause of restatements. Earlier in the
decade and during prior decades, earnings management was more a game of
"smoothing out" the peaks and valleys in a corporation's income flow in order
to reduce the apparent volatility in the corporation's returns. Thus,
managements characteristically attempted to hide "excess earnings" in "rainy
day reserves" in order to use such funds later to smooth out undesired declines
in the firm's earnings.
Despite this earlier preference for income-smoothing, by the end of the
1990s, these same firms were robbing future periods for earnings that could be
recognized immediately. In short, "income smoothing" gave way to more
predatory behavior. Interestingly, restatements involving revenue recognition
produced disproportionately large losses.37  Seemingly, the market feared
revenue-timing restatements more than others because of the apparent signal
they carried that reported earnings could not be trusted. Yet, despite the
market's antipathy for them, revenue recognition restatements became the
most common form of restatement. At a minimum, this suggests that the
interests of management and shareholders were not aligned, and gatekeepers
appear to have been progressively caught in the middle.
C. Security Analysts During the 1990s
Before any attempt is made to generalize about the motivations that led
managements to pressure their auditors for premature revenue recognition, it is
useful to recognize that this pattern of increased acquiescence by the
of market capitalization. In short, however expressed, the relative size of the losses
increased over this period.
36 See GAO Study, supra note 4, at 5. Revenue recognition was also the leading reason
for restatements in each individual year over this period. Id.
" While revenue recognition restatements accounted for 39% of restatements over the
1997 to 2002 period, they were associated with $56 billion (or roughly 56%) of the $100
billion in market capitalization that restating companies lost over this period. Id. at 28.
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gatekeeper to its clients' demands during the 1990s was not limited to the
auditing profession. Security analysts are probably the only other profession
that has experienced equivalent (or harsher) criticism since the collapse of the
high-tech bubble in 2000. Again, growing conflicts of interest appear to
explain their change in behavior.
Some of the evidence relating to gatekeeper failure involving analysts is
anecdotal, but striking. As late as October 2001, shortly before Enron's
bankruptcy, sixteen out of the seventeen securities analysts covering Enron
maintained "buy" or "strong buy" recommendations on its stock.38 Yet,
months earlier, as of December 31, 2000, Enron already had a stock price that
was seventy times earnings and six times its book value, and had earned an
89% return for the year (despite a 9% decrease over the same period for the
S&P 500 index). 39 Such a profile should have alerted any analyst who was
even half awake to the possibility that Enron was seriously overvalued.
Symptomatically, however, the first brokerage firm to downgrade Enron to a
"sell" rating in 2001 was Prudential Securities, which did not then engage in
investment banking activities. 40 Prudential was also believed to have the
highest proportion of sell ratings among the stocks it evaluated.4' Perhaps,
Prudential also woke up late, but it is still at least revealing that the least
conflicted were the first to awake.
How close then are the similarities between analysts and auditors? Much
like auditors, analysts are also "reputational intermediaries," whose desire to
be perceived as credible and objective may often be subordinated to their
desire to retain and please investment banking clients. One statistic inevitably
comes up in any assessment of analyst objectivity: namely, the curious fact that
the ratio of "buy" recommendations to "sell" recommendations has recently
38 See The Collapse of Enron: The Role Analysts Played and the Conflicts They Face:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27,
2002) (prepared testimony of Frank Torres, Legislative Counsel, Consumers' Union) ("In
the case of Enron, 16 out of 17 analysts had a buy or a strong buy rating, one had a hold,
none had a sell--even as the company stock had lost over half its value and its CEO
suddenly resigned."). See also Hearing before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs,
107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 25, 2002) (prepared testimony of Frank Partnoy, Professor of
Law, University of San Diego School of Law) (similarly noting the sixteen out of seventeen
tabulation).
39 See Paul M. Healy & Krishna Palepu, The Fall of Enron, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring
2003, at 3 (indicating the high expectations held by the market for Enron's future
performance).
40 See Lauren Young, Independence Day, SMARTMONEY, May 1, 2001, at 28 (arguing
that analysts for brokerage firms without investment banking departments feel less pressure
to tout the stocks of investment banking clients and potential clients, and noting Prudential's
"liberal use of the sell word[]" since eliminating its own investment banking department).
41 Id. (noting that Prudential's twenty-nine "sell" ratings exceeded all other brokerage
firms).
[Vol. 84:301
GA TEKEEPER FAIL URE AND REFORM
been as high as 100-to-1.42 In truth, this particular statistic may not be as
compelling as it initially sounds because there are obvious reasons why "buy"
recommendations will normally outnumber "sell" recommendations, even in
the absence of conflicts of interest.43 Yet, a related statistic may be more
revealing because it underscores the apparent transition that took place in the
1990s and parallels the earlier noted increase in accounting restatements during
the 1990s. According to a study by Thomson Financial, the ratio of "buy" to
"sell" recommendations increased from 6-to-1 in 1991 to 100-to-I by 2000.44
Other evidence corroborates this picture of a systematic analyst bias towards
optimism. Studying security analyst career patterns over the last two decades,
Hong and Kubik find that career advancement for analysts depended more on a
bias towards optimism than on the overall accuracy of their forecasts. 45
Although accuracy did matter, a tendency to be more optimistic than the
consensus of analysts seemed to protect analysts from downward movement
within their industry's hierarchy, and this tendency was most pronounced in
the case of analysts who covered stocks underwritten by their own firms. 46
More importantly, this tendency for optimism to outweigh accuracy increased
during the late I 990s. 47 They interpret their findings as at least consistent with
the view "that Wall Street lost any self-discipline to produce accurate research
during the recent stock market mania. '48 Perhaps this assessment overstates,
42 A study by Thomson Financial/First Call has found that less than one percent of the
28,000 stock recommendations issued by brokerage firm analysts during late 1999 and most
of 2000 were sell recommendations. See Analyzing the Analysts: Are Investors Getting
Unbiased Research from Wall Street? Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, 107th Cong. (Jun. 14, 2001)
(opening statement of Congressman Paul E. Kanjorski, Ranking Democratic Member,
House Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises).
41 "Sell-side" analysts are employed by brokerage firms that understandably wish to
maximize brokerage transactions. In this light, a buy recommendation addresses the entire
market and certainly all the firm's customers, while a sell recommendation addresses only
those customers who own the stock (probably well under one percent) and those with
margin accounts who are willing to sell the stock short. In addition, sell recommendations
annoy not only the issuer company, but also institutional investors who are afraid that sell
recommendations will spook retail investors, causing them to panic and sell, while the
institution is locked into a large position that cannot be easily liquidated.
4 See id. at 1 (citing study by Thomson Financial/First Call).
41 See Harrison Hong & Jeffrey Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concerns and
Biased Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FtN. 313, 345 (2003) (concluding that brokerage houses
care about and reward the accuracy of their analysts' predictions, but also that "they reward
optimistic analysts").
46 Id. at 341.
47 Id. at 342, 346 (finding that between 1996 and 2000 a strong bias towards optimism
decreased an analyst's risk of downward movement in the industry, and that accuracy
generally mattered less during this period in determining movement of an analyst either up
or down in the industry hierarchy).
41 Id. at 345-46.
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but the conclusion seems hard to escape that something happened during the
1990s that compromised the independence and objectivity of the gatekeepers
on whom our private system of corporate governance depends. 49 Even before
Enron, much evidence showed that the most sophisticated market participants
understood the extent of these conflicts and had ceased to rely on "sell-side"
analysts.50
D. Explaining Gatekeeper Failure
The same observation has probably occurred to many: none of the
watchdogs that should have detected Enron's collapse-auditors, analysts, or
debt rating agencies-awoke before the penultimate moment. This is the
common denominator, not just in the case of Enron, but also in many of the
other "accounting irregularity" cases of 2001-2002. What plausible hypothesis
can explain the collective failure of these gatekeepers? Here, several different,
although ultimately complementary, stories can be told. Initially, this section
will review two generalized stories: the first will be called the "general
deterrence" story; and the second, the "bubble" story. Then, it will focus on
allocating responsibility among gatekeepers, managers, and investors.
1. The Deterrence Explanation: The Underdeterred Gatekeeper
The general deterrence story focuses on the decline in the expected liability
costs associated with acquiescence by auditors in aggressive accounting
policies favored by managements. It postulates that, during the 1990s, the risk
of auditor liability declined, while the benefits of acquiescence increased.
Economics 101 teaches us that when the costs go down while the benefits
associated with any activity go up, the output of the activity will increase.
Here, the activity that increased was auditor acquiescence.
Prior to the 1990s, auditors faced a veiy real risk of civil liability,
principally from class action litigation.5' Why did the legal risks go down
49 Participants in the industry also report that its professional culture changed
dramatically in the late 1990s, particularly as investment banking firms began to hire "star"
analysts for their marketing clout. See Gretchen Morgenson, Requiem for an Honorable
Profession, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2002, § 3, at 1 (suggesting that major change in the Wall
Street research culture dates from around 1996).
50 Although the empirical evidence is limited, it suggests that "independent" analysts
(i.e., analysts not associated with the underwriter for a particular issuer) behave differently
than, and tend to outperform, analysts who are associated with the issuer's underwriter. See
R. Michaely & K. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst
Recommendations, 12 REv. FrN. STUD. 653, 653 (1999).
11 As of 1992, Congress was advised that the securities fraud litigation costs for just the
six largest accounting firms (then the "Big Six") totaled $783 million, or more than 14% of
their audit revenues. Potential exposure to loss was in the billions. See Private Litigation
Under the Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. No.103-431
(1993) (statement of Jake L. Netterville, Chairman of the Board, American Institute of
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during the 1990s? The obvious list of reasons would include:
(a) the Supreme Court's Lampf Pleva decision in 1991, which
significantly shortened the statute of limitations applicable to
securities fraud;52
(b) the Supreme Court's Central Bank of Denver decision in 1994, 53
which eliminated private "aiding and abetting" liability in securities
fraud cases;
(c) the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"),
which
(i) raised the pleading standards for securities class actions to a level
well above that applicable to fraud actions generally;
(ii) substituted proportionate liability for "joint and several" liability;
(iii) restricted the sweep of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations ("RICO") statute so that it could no longer convert
securities fraud class actions for compensatory damages into
actions for treble damages; and
(iv) adopted a very protective safe harbor for forward-looking
information; 54 and
(d) the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"),
which abolished state court class actions alleging securities fraud. 55
Certified Public Accountants), reprinted in Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1696 (Jan. 10,
1996). One major auditing firm, Laventhol & Horwath, did fail and entered bankruptcy as a
result of litigation and associated scandals growing out of the savings and loan scandals of
the 1980s. See What Role Should CPA's be Playing in Audit Reform?, PARTNER'S REPORT
FOR CPA FiRM OWNERS 1, 11 (Apr. 2002) (discussing experience of Laventhol & Horwath).
The accounting profession's bitter experience with class litigation in the 1980s and 1990s
probably explains why it became the strongest and most organized champion of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.
52 Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 359-61 (1991)
(creating a federal rule requiring plaintiffs to file within one year of when they should have
known of the violation underlying their action, but in no event more than three years after
the violation). This one- to three-year period was typically shorter than the previously
applicable limitations periods, which were determined by analogy to state statutes and often
permitted a five- or six-year delay-if that was the period within which a common law fraud
action could be maintained in the particular state.
13 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
191 (1994) (holding "that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b)" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
54 The relevant provisions of the PSLRA are contained in section 21 D of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, except for the "safe harbor," which is in section 21 E of that Act.
11 See Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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The individual impact of each of these changes probably cannot be reliably
measured, but their concurrent aggregate impact is clear: they greatly reduced
the incentives of plaintiffs in securities class actions to sue secondary
participants such as auditors, analysts, and attorneys. As an SEC study noted,
the number of audit-related suits filed against the then "Big Six" accounting
firms in 1990 to 1992 was 192, 172, and 141, respectively. 56 Yet, in the first
year following the passage of the PSLRA (1996), the SEC found that out of the
105 securities class actions it found to have been filed in that year, accounting
firms were named in only 6 cases, corporate counsel in no cases, and
underwriters in 19 cases. 57 It concluded: "Secondary defendants such as
accountants and lawyers, are being named less frequently in securities class
actions."5 8
Not only did the threat of private enforcement decline, but the prospect of
public enforcement similarly subsided. In particular, there is reason to believe
that, from some point in the 1980s until the late 1990s, the SEC shifted its
enforcement focus away from actions against the Big Five accounting firms
towards other priorities. 59 In any event, the point here is not that any of these
For an analysis and critique of this statute, see Richard Painter, Responding to a False
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes ofAction, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1998) (arguing that state law securities fraud actions will play a much reduced role in
securities regulation following adoption of the SLUSA).
56 See U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE
SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 22 (Apr. 1997), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt (last accessed Mar. 12, 2004) (noting a decline
in the frequency of securities lawsuits against accountants and law firms). The figures for
the years 1990 to 1992 were reported to the SEC by the Big Six and include all class actions
against them, which could include some non-securities class actions. Nonetheless, the
number of such non-securities actions seems likely to have been small. As the above SEC
study further notes: "[D]uring the period from 1991 through June 1996, accountants were
defendants in 52 reported settlements (as opposed to complaints) ... and law firms were
defendants in 7. Thus, there seems to be a real decline in the number of lawsuits against
secondary defendants." Id. (internal footnotes omitted). This low incidence of securities
class actions against auditors appears to have continued through 2001-and then began to
rise dramatically. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, 2002 SECURITIES LITIGATION
STUDY 7 (2003) (reporting that the number of securities class actions against auditors fell
from 1998 to 2001, but increased 89% between 2001 and 2002).
57 U.S. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMM'N, supra note 56, at 21-22.
58 Id. at 4. As this study expressly noted, this decline could have been caused both by the
PSLRA and the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver in 1994 that ended
private "aiding and abetting" liability under Rule lOb-5. See supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
59 This point has been orally made to me by several former SEC officials, including
Stanley Sporkin, the long-time former head of the Commission's Division of Enforcement.
They believe that the SEC's enforcement action against Arthur Andersen, which was
resolved in June 2001, was one of the very few (and perhaps the only) enforcement actions
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changes were necessarily unjustified or excessive, but rather that their
collective impact was to appreciably reduce the risk of liability. Auditors were
the special beneficiaries of many of these provisions. For example, the
pleading rules and the new standard of proportionate liability protected them
far more than it did most corporate defendants. 60 Although auditors are still
sued today, the settlement value of cases against auditors has gone way down.
Correspondingly, the benefits of acquiescence to auditors rose over this
same period, as the Big Five learned during the 1990s how to cross-sell
consulting services and to treat the auditing function principally as a portal of
entry into a lucrative client. Prior to the mid- 1990s, the provision of consulting
services to audit clients was infrequent and insubstantial in the aggregate. 6'
Yet, according to one recent survey, the typical large public corporation now
pays its auditor for consulting services three times what it pays the same
auditor for auditing services. 62 Not only did auditing firms see more profit
brought against a Big Five accounting firm on fraud grounds during the 1990s. See SEC v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, S.E.C. Litigation Release No. 17039 at 3 (June 19, 2001), 2001 SEC
LEXIS 1159. Although the Commission did bring charges during the 1990s against
individual partners in these firms, the Commission appears to have been deterred from
bringing suits against the Big Five themselves because such actions were extremely costly
in manpower and expense and the defendants could be expected to resist zealously. In
contrast, during the 1980s, especially during Mr. Sporkin's tenure as head of the
Enforcement Division, the SEC regularly brought enforcement actions against the Big Five.
60 At a minimum, plaintiffs today must plead with particularity facts giving rise to a
strong inference of fraud. See, e.g., Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2000). At the
outset of a case, it may be possible to plead such facts with respect to the management of the
corporate defendant (for example, based on insider sales by such persons prior to the public
disclosure of the adverse information that caused the stock drop), but rarely is it possible to
plead such information with respect to the auditors (who by law cannot own stock in their
client). In short, the plaintiff faces a "Catch 22" dilemma in suing the auditor: it cannot
plead fraud with particularity until it obtains discovery, and it cannot obtain discovery under
the PSLRA until it pleads fraud with particularity.
61 Consulting fees paid by audit clients exploded during the 1990s. According to the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness, which was appointed in 1999 by the Public Oversight Board
at the request of the SEC to study audit practices, "audit firms' fees from consulting services
for their SEC clients increased from 17% ... of audit fees in 1990 to 67%... in 1999." See
PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 102 (Exposure Draft
2000). In 1990, the Panel found that 80% of the Big Five firms' SEC clients received no
consulting services from their auditors, and only 1% of those SEC clients paid consulting
fees exceeding their auditing fees to the Big Five. Id. While the Panel found only marginal
changes during the 1990s, later studies have found that consulting fees have become a
multiple of the audit fee for large public corporations. See infra note 62 and accompanying
text.
62 A survey by The Chicago Tribune finds that the one-hundred largest corporations in
the Chicago area (determined on the basis of market capitalization) paid consulting fees to
their auditors that were on average over three times the audit fee paid the same auditor. See
Janet Kidd Stewart & Andrew Countryman, Local Audit Conflicts Add Up: Consulting
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potential in consulting than in auditing, but, during the 1990s, some also began
to compete based on a strategy of "low balling" under which auditing services
were offered at rates that were marginal to arguably below cost. The rationale
for such a strategy was that the auditing function was essentially a loss leader
by which more lucrative services could be marketed.
Although this argument that the provision of consulting services eroded
auditor independence has considerable explanatory power, there is an obvious
reply: those who defend the propriety of consulting services by auditors
respond that the growth of consulting services made little real difference
because the audit firm was already conflicted by the fact that the client paid its
fees. Put as bluntly as possible, the audit partner of a major client (such as
Enron) is always conflicted by the fact that such a partner has virtually a "one-
client" practice. Whoever is the gatekeeper-attorney, auditor, or analyst-a
"one client" practice compromises the agent. Should the partner lose that
client for any reason, the partner will not easily find a replacement client and
may need to find employment elsewhere. In short, both critics and defenders
of the status quo tend to agree that the individual audit partner is already
inevitably compromised by his or her desire to retain the client on whom
partner's career depends. From this premise, a prophylactic rule prohibiting
the firm's involvement in consulting might achieve little.
Even if true in part, this rebuttal nonetheless misses one key point: the
difficulty faced by the client in firing the auditor in the real world. As
discussed below, there are real costs associated with firing an auditor (but, in
contrast, none to speak of in firing a consultant). Given this disparity, an
unintended consequence of combining consulting services with auditing
services in one firm is that the union of the two enables the client to more
effectively threaten the auditing firm in a "low visibility" way. To illustrate
this point, let us suppose, for example, that a client becomes dissatisfied with
an auditor who refuses to endorse an aggressive accounting policy favored by
its management. Today, the client cannot easily fire the auditor. Firing the
auditor may result in public embarrassment, potential public disclosure of the
reasons for the auditor's dismissal or resignation, or a probable SEC
intervention. 63 However, if the auditor also becomes a consultant to the client,
the client can then easily terminate the auditor as a consultant (or reduce its use
of the firm's consulting services) in retaliation for the auditor's intransigence.
Deals, Hiring Practices In Question, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2002, at C1. The extreme example
in this study was Motorola, which had over a 16:1 ratio between consulting fees and audit
fees. Id.
63 Item 4 ("Changes in Registrants Certifying Accountant") of Form 8-K requires a
"reporting" company to file a Form 8-K within five days after the resignation or dismissal of
the issuer's independent accountant or that of the independent accountant for a significant
subsidiary of the issuer. The Form 8-K must then provide the elaborate disclosures
mandated by Item 304 of Regulation S-K relating to any dispute or disagreement between
the auditor and the accountant. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.304 (2003) ("Changes in and
Disagreements With Accountants on Accounting and Financial Disclosure").
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This low visibility response neither requires any disclosure nor invites any
SEC oversight and yet incentivizes the audit firm to replace the intransigent
audit partner. In effect, the client can bribe (or coerce) the auditor in its core
professional role by increasing (or reducing) its use of consulting services.
Of course, this argument that the client can discipline and threaten the
auditor/consultant in ways that it could not discipline the simple auditor is
based more on logic than actual case histories. But it does fit the available
data. A recent study by academic accounting experts, based on proxy
statements filed during the first half of 2001, finds that those firms that
purchased more non-audit services from their auditor (as a percentage of the
total fee paid to the audit firm) were more likely to fit the profile of a firm
engaging in earnings management. 64
2. The Market Bubble Story
Alternatively, the downfalls of Enron and Arthur Andersen, and the host of
other sudden stock declines in 2001 to 2002, can be seen as the consequence of
a classic bubble that overtook the equity markets in the late 1990s and
produced a market euphoria. 65 But what exactly is the connection between a
market bubble and gatekeeper failure? Here, a hypothesis needs to be
advanced that cannot be rigorously proven, but that is consistent with modem
behavioral economics: in a bubble, gatekeepers become less relevant and hence
experience a decline in both their leverage over their client and the value of
their reputational capital. That is, in an atmosphere of market euphoria,
I See Richard Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services
and Earnings Management, 77 ACCT. REV. 71, 98-100 (Supp. 2002) (finding "a positive
association between nonaudit fees and the likelihood of reporting small earnings surprise").
Firms purchasing more non-audit services were found more likely to just meet or beat
analysts' forecasts, which is the standard profile of the firm playing "the numbers game."
Id. at 89.
65 The literature on bubbles is now burgeoning. Perhaps the best known scholar in this
field was Charles Kindleberger, who viewed bubbles as "demand determined" and the
product of irrational investors. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIA, PANICS AND
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 76-78 (2000). See also ANDREI SCHLEIFER,
INEFFICIENT MARKETS 154 (2000) (discussing the phenomenon whereby certain traders
"react to past price changes, as opposed to particular news," which leads to price bubbles);
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 4-5 (2001) (noting that the extreme disparity
between the increase in stock indexes during the mid-1990s-the Dow Jones Industrial
Average tripling in five years, for example-and the comparatively modest performance of
other economic indicators during the same period, likely indicated that the "period of high
stock market pricing [would] ... be followed by poor or negative performance"); Kenneth
A. Froot & Maurice Obstfeld, Intrinsic Bubbles: The Case of Stock Prices, 81 AM. ECON.
REv. 1189, 1208 (1991) (arguing that models that describe overreactions in stock prices to
changes in fundamentals confirm the existence of a bubble). While most of these recent
accounts focus on and assign causal responsibility to "noise traders," the account offered
here focuses more on a behavioral phenomenon: "persistence bias" and the tendency of
investors to expect recent exceptional returns to continue.
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investors rely less on gatekeepers, and managements, in turn, regard them as
more a formality than a necessity. Gatekeepers provide a critical service only
when investors are cautious and skeptical and therefore rely on their services.
In a market bubble, in contrast, caution and skepticism are by definition largely
abandoned. In such an environment, auditors continue to be used more
because SEC rules mandate their use (or because no individual firm wishes to
call attention to itself by becoming the first to dispense with them) than
because investors actually demand their use. As a result, because gatekeepers
have reduced relevance, they also have reduced leverage with their clients.
Thus, if we assume that the auditor will be largely ignored by euphoric
investors, the rational auditor's best competitive strategy (at least for the short
term) was to become as acquiescent and low cost as possible.
Although this thesis assigns some causal responsibility to investors
themselves for their own losses, it does not absolve gatekeepers from
responsibility. For example, even if shareholders do not care much during a
bubble about the auditor's reputation, it is still possible for an auditor to
intervene effectively and prevent fraud, either by refusing to certify the issuer's
financial statements, by withdrawing its certificate on a later discovery of the
fraud, or by notifying the SEC.66
The key element in this story involves why investors cease to care about the
gatekeeper's reputation. After all, the rise of auditing as a profession was the
product of investors' own concerns about fraud and irregularity, not regulatory
requirements. What then caused this concern to weaken? Here, behavioral
economics supplies a plausible answer. Modem economics recognizes that
individuals, including investors, have "bounded rationality" and do not pursue
all information relevant to an optimal decision.67 The Nobel Prize-winning
research of Professors Kahneman and Tversky has in particular demonstrated
that individuals typically make decisions by using heuristics-that is, rules of
thumb-rather than by incorporating all obtainable information. A heuristic
that they find to be pervasively used by individuals and that has particular
relevance to the context of securities markets is the "availability heuristic. '68 It
66 Section 10A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the auditor of a public
company to notify the Commission where the auditor discovers an "illegal act [that] has a
material effect on the financial statements of the issuer" and management and the board of
the issuer have not taken "timely and appropriate remedial action" after notification by the
auditor. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(A) (2000). Since its adoption in 1995, this provision has
been seldom, if ever, employed. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
67 For overviews of behavioral economics, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1473 (1998); Cass Sunstein,
Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). The term "bounded
rationality" was coined by Herbert Simon, a Nobel Prize winner, and is broadly accepted by
most economists. See Herbert A. Simon, Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought,
68 AM. ECON. REv. 1, 10 (1978) (papers and proceedings).
68 See Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1477-78 (describing the availability heuristic as the
process whereby individuals estimate the frequency of an event based on their ability to
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asserts that individuals estimate the frequency of an event by recalling recent
instances of its occurring (even if these instances are normally rare or
infrequent, when viewed from a longer term perspective). Hence, if the stock
market has recently experienced extraordinary returns for several years, it
becomes predictable that individuals will overestimate the likelihood of such
extraordinary gains continuing.69 In effect, there is a status quo or persistence
bias-what has recently occurred is expected to continue. Thus, as the market
soared in the early and mid-1990s, investors, operating on heuristics, came to
assume that this pattern would continue. Further aggravating this tendency is
the deep-seated bias displayed by many individuals toward optimism in
predicting future events.70
Thus, from the perspective of behavioral economics, "bubbles" are not
irrational moments of speculative excess or frenzy, but rather are the product
of the predictable expectations of individuals, who tend to assume that
whatever has recently occurred will persist. To trigger this persistence bias, it
is arguably only necessary that market returns have in fact been extraordinary
for a few successive years in order to cause investors to treat this phenomenon
as normal and likely to continue. Such an explanation helps us understand
why bubbles have re-occurred throughout history. Their re-occurrence is
explained not by the hypothesis that investors are inherently gullible, but by
the explanation that a period of extraordinary returns creates an expectation
that such returns are normal and will persist.
Such heuristic biases are not, of course, the whole story. For the securities
analyst, a market bubble presents a different and more serious challenge:
during a bubble, those who recklessly predict extraordinary returns will
outperform those who are cautious and prudent. Hence, in a bubble, extreme
optimism for analysts becomes less a heuristic bias than a competitive
necessity. Put more bluntly, it is dangerous to be sane in an insane world. As
a result, the securities analyst who prudently predicted reasonable growth and
stock appreciation during the 1990s was increasingly left in the dust by the
investment guru who prophesized a new investment paradigm in which
revenues and costs were less important than the number of "hits" on a website.
remember previous instances of the same or similar events); see also Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (giving the example of an
individual assessing his risk of heart attack based on his recall of heart attacks striking his
acquaintances).
69 This is by no means the only way to explain bubbles without resorting to claims of
mass delusion. An alternative theory is that institutional money managers have rational
incentives to engage in "herding behavior," preferring a common wrong decision to a risky
correct one. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
70 See Jolls et al., supra note 67, at 1524-25 (arguing that "[p]eople tend to think that bad
events are far less likely to happen to them than to others"); see also Neil D. Weinstein,
Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806
(1980).
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Institutional factors compounded this problem. As the initial public offering
("IPO") market soared in the 1990s, securities analysts became celebrities and
valuable assets to their firms;71 indeed, they became the principal means by
which investment banks competed for IPO clients, as the underwriter with the
"star" analyst could produce the greatest first day stock price spike in an IPO.
But as their salaries soared, analyst compensation came increasingly from the
investment banking side of their firms. Hence, just as in the case of the
auditor, the analyst's economic position became progressively dependent on
promoting interests and services outside their profession (i.e., consulting
income in the case of the auditor and the interests of investment bankers in the
case of the analyst) who had little reason to respect or observe the standards or
professional culture within the gatekeeper's profession. 72
One common denominator linking these examples is that, as auditors
increasingly sought consulting income and as analysts became more dependent
on an investment banking subsidy, these gatekeepers' normal desire to
preserve their reputational capital for the long run was subordinated to their
desire to obtain extraordinary returns in the short run that could be obtained
only by risking that reputational capital. Alternatively, the value of
gatekeepers' reputational capital may have simply declined in a bubble,
because investors in such an environment rationally reduce their reliance on
gatekeeping services based on their false belief that extraordinary returns will
persist. Under either story (or both together), it could have become more
profitable for firms to realize the value of their reputational capital by trading
on it in the short-run than by preserving it forever. Indeed, during the 1990s,
to the extent that auditing became a loss leader for multi-service accounting
firms eager to sell more lucrative consulting services and, to the extent that
securities analysts began to be subsidized by investment banking, each
profession became less self-supporting and more dependent on those who
wished to profit from the liquidation of their reputational capital.
3. Allocating Responsibility Among Gatekeepers, Managers, and
Investors
The foregoing explanations still do not fully explain the mechanisms by
which reputational capital built up over decades might be sacrificed (or, more
7' For the view that investment banking firms changed their competitive strategies in or
around 1996 and thereafter sought the "popular, high-profile analyst" as a means of
acquiring IPO clients, see Morgenson, supra note 49 (quoting chief investment officer at
Trust Company of the West as indicating the ability of such analysts to "'grab[] a bigger
share of those lucrative investment banking fees').
72 This idea that professional gatekeepers became dominated by persons outside their
profession is at the heart of a recent lawsuit initiated by the New York Attorney General
against five chief executive officers of major U.S. corporations. See Patrick McGeehan,
Spitzer Sues Executives of Telecom Companies Over 'Ill Gotten' Gains, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2002, at C1.
[Vol. 84:301
GATEKEEPER FAILURE AND REFORM
accurately, liquidated) once legal risks declined and/or a bubble developed.
Because gatekeepers are agents who must compete in increasingly competitive
markets to win and hold clients, changes that affect their principals will
necessarily affect them as well. Whether we view the gatekeeper's principal as
corporate management or as shareholders, the behavior and incentives of both
changed during the 1990s and thereby placed gatekeepers, as their agents,
under increased pressure.
a. The Changing Motivations of Managers
The pressure on gatekeepers to acquiesce in earnings management was not
constant over time but rather accelerated during the 1990s as managerial
incentives changed. Executive compensation shifted during the 1990s from
being primarily cash-based to being primarily equity-based. By 2001, equity-
based compensation constituted approximately two-thirds of the median annual
compensation of chief executives of large public corporations, up from eight
percent in 1990 and zero percent in 1984. 73 Another measure of this shift is
the growth in stock options. Over the last decade, stock options rose from five
percent of shares outstanding at major U.S. companies to fifteen percent-a
three-hundred percent increase. 74 The value of these options rose by an even
greater percentage and over a dramatically shorter period: from $50 billion in
1997, in the case of the two-thousand largest corporations to $162 billion in
2000-an over three-hundred percent rise in three years. 75  Stock options
create an obvious and potentially perverse incentive to engage in short-run,
rather than long-term, stock price maximization because executives can
exercise their stock options and sell the underlying shares on the same day.
76
73 See Brian J. Hall, Six Challenges in Designing Equity-Based Pay, J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN., Spring 2003, at 23 fig. 1.
71 See Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate Conduct: News Analysis; Bush Failed to Stress
Need to Rein in Stock Options, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2002, at CI [hereinafter Morgenson,
Corporate Conduct] ("Once a rarity, options are now ubiquitous at American companies; in
the last 10 years, options have risen from 5 percent of shares outstanding at major
companies to 15 percent."); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Market Watch: Time For
Accountability at the Corporate Candy Store, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, § 3, at 1 ("In the
last decade, options have grown from 5 percent of shares outstanding at major companies to
15 percent.").
75 See Morgenson, Corporate Conduct, supra note 74 (citing study by Sanford C.
Bernstein & Co.). Thus, if $162 billion is the value of all options in these two-thousand
companies, aggressive accounting policies that temporarily raise stock prices by as little as
ten percent create a potential gain for executives of over $16 billion-a substantial
incentive.
76 See Hall, supra note 73, at 24-29 (surveying misincentives in stock options). This
point has also been made by a variety of commentators who have called for minimum
holding periods or other curbs on stock options. These include Henry M. Paulson, Jr., chief
executive of Goldman, Sachs, and Senator John McCain of Arizona. See David Leonhardt,
Corporate Conduct: Compensation: Anger at Executives' Profits Fuels Support for Stock
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The key problem here is not that stock options provide excessive
compensation but that they provide excessive liquidity. 77 This excess liquidity
was, in turn, partially the product of deregulatory reform in the early 1990s,
which relaxed the rules under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 to permit officers and directors to exercise stock options and sell the
underlying shares without holding the shares for the previously required six-
month period.7 8 Thus, if executives inflate the stock price of their company
through premature revenue recognition or other classic earnings management
techniques, they could quickly bail out in the short term by exercising their
options and selling, leaving shareholders to bear the cost of the stock decline
when the inflated stock price could not be maintained over subsequent periods.
Given these incentives, it became rational for corporate executives to use
lucrative consulting contracts, or other positive and negative incentives, to
induce gatekeepers to engage in conduct that assisted their short-term market
manipulations. The bottom line is that the growth of stock options resulted in
gatekeepers being placed under greater pressure to acquiesce in short-term
oriented financial and accounting strategies.
b. The Role of Investors
Investors cannot fairly be presented as entirely innocent victims in the recent
epidemic of financial irregularities. At a minimum, a bubble reflects investors'
acquiescence in unrealistic valuations. More importantly, conflicts of interest
on the part of gatekeepers that might alarm investors in other circumstances
Curb, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at Al.
71 See Hall, supra note 73, at 24-29 (underscoring the temptation of executives to
"artificially boost the stock price" and subsequently "cash out their equity holdings"). It
should be noted here that other forms of equity compensation, such as restricted stock, do
not give rise to this same level of conflict because management must either hold the stock
longer or can only sell a modest percentage of it in any given year, thus precluding the
possibility of a bail-out.
78 Rule 16b-3(d) expressly permits an officer or director otherwise subject to the "short-
swing" profit provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to exercise
a qualified stock option and sell the underlying shares immediately "if at least six months
elapse from the date of the acquisition of the derivative security to the date of disposition of
the.., underlying equity security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-3(d). The SEC comprehensively
revised its rules under section 16(b) in 1991, in part to facilitate the use of stock options as
executive compensation and to "reduce the regulatory burden" under section 16(b). See
Exchange Act Release No. 34-28869, 56 Fed. Reg. 7242, 7243, 7248 (Feb. 21, 1991)
(remarking that the amendments "exempt... certain transactions ... from the short-swing
profit recovery provisions of Section 16" to "achieve greater clarity, enhance consistency
with the statutory purpose, and improve compliance with the reporting provisions of the
rules"). A premise of this reform was that "holding derivative securities is functionally
equivalent to holding the underlying equity security for purpose of Section 16." Id. at 7248.
Hence, the SEC permitted the tacking of the option-holding period with the stock's holding
period, thereby enabling officers and directors to exercise options and sell on the same day
(if the option had already been held six months).
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may be accepted (or at least repressed) during a bubble. To be sure, many
investors were likely misled by biased analyst research and overstated
earnings, but this does not absolve the "buy side" of all responsibility.
Particularly in the case of institutional investors, who account for over half the
ownership and seventy-five percent of the trading in NYSE-listed equities, 79
financial intermediaries may have again failed. According to one estimate, at
the peak of the market, sixty percent of Enron stock was held by large
institutional investors. 80 Why didn't they see that Enron was overvalued, at
least once alarm bells began to sound? A plausible explanation for the failure
of institutional investors to respond to warning signals in the case of Enron
starts from the premise that professional money managers are principally
motivated by the desire to perform no worse than their major institutional
rivals; this pressure quickly leads to herding behavior.81 According to this
analysis, fund managers attract investor funds and maximize their fees based
on their "quarterly reported performance relative to comparable funds or
indices. '82 Thus, if a fund manager discovers that Enron is overvalued and
sells his firm's investment, the manager and the manager's clients do well-
but only if the market agrees and Enron's stock price falls that quarter. If the
market persists in overvaluing Enron or actually climbs based on biased "sell-
side" research, the manager becomes an unfortunately premature prophet, and
the manager's performance relative to his rivals falls. Precisely to the extent
that this manager is accountable to the market, clients' funds flow out of this
manager's account to those of rival fund managers, thereby collapsing like an
accordion the funds under his management, so that this manager does not profit
significantly even when Enron ultimately does collapse. In such an
environment, there is little incentive to be ahead of the crowd and considerable
incentive to ride the bubble to its top in order not to underperform rival
investment managers. The result is behavior that economists call "herding"
because, by following the herd, the fund manager will not underperform most
of the manager's rivals. Put differently, the fund manager can survive
mistakes that others also make but will be more severely injured by correct
decisions that the market only belatedly recognizes. In turn, this may explain
why institutions would herd and follow "sell-side" research that they know to
79 For these statistics, see James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, Leaving Money on the
Table: Do Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH.
U. L.Q. 855, 855 n.4 (2002).
8 See Healy & Palepu, supra note 39, at 22 (listing Enron's corporate investors,
including Janus Capital Corp., Fidelity Management & Research, and Putnam Investment
Management).
81 The term "herding" was coined over a decade ago by Scharfstein and Stein. David S.
Scharfstein & Jeremy Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM. EcON. REv. 465, 466
(1990); see also Healy & Palepu, supra note 39, at 26-27.
82 Healy & Palepu, supra note 39, at 26 (claiming that "flows into and out of a fund each
quarter" are rooted in comparisons to alternative funds or indices, which ultimately
generates herding behavior).
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be biased: that is, because they anticipated that others would follow it also,
leaving them in the safe position of being part of the herd.
c. The Role of Gatekeepers
This conclusion that even sophisticated investors will follow and rely on
"sell-side" research that they know to be biased brings us back to the central
role of gatekeepers. To some degree, gatekeepers will be followed even when
they are not trusted because it is expected that they will influence the market.
In addition, there is evidence that gatekeepers "herd" for careerist reasons. For
example, career concerns appear to motivate security analysts not to deviate far
from the consensus earnings forecasts, and particularly to avoid downward
deviations.83 As a result, it becomes predictable that some degree of bias will
distort analyst recommendations (and that such advice will be followed), even
when the market expects inflation. Moreover, ending the most obvious
conflicts of interest (as Sarbanes-Oxley and related reforms attempt to do) will
not solve this problem, because the careerist motives will remain.
4. A Preliminary Evaluation
Does it matter which of the foregoing two stories-the deterrence story or
the bubble story-is deemed more persuasive? Although they are
complementary rather than contradictory, their relative plausibility may bear
on whether particular reforms are necessary, desirable, or sufficient. To the
extent one accepts the deterrence story, the logical prescription is legal change
aimed at restoring an adequate legal threat. In principle, these changes could
either raise the costs or lower the benefits of acquiescence to auditors (or both).
To the extent one accepts the bubble story, the problem may be self-correcting.
That is, once the bubble bursts, gatekeepers come back into fashion, as
investors become skeptics who once again demand assurances that only
credible reputational intermediaries can provide.84 Alternatively, structural
83 See Harrison Hong et al., Security Analysts' Career Concerns and the Herding of
Earnings Forecasts, 31 RAND J. ECON. 121, 122-23 (2000) (concluding that analysts
predicting bold, yet accurate, forecasts do not significantly improve their career prospects);
see also Hong & Kubik, supra note 45, at 341-46 (finding systematic tendency towards
overly optimistic advice based on careerist considerations).
84 Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan has indeed suggested that market
corrections will largely solve the problems uncovered in the wake of Enron. See Alan
Greenspan, Corporate Governance, Address at the Stem School of Business, New York
University (Mar. 26, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2002/200203262/default.htm (last accessed Mar. 12, 2004). In his view, earnings
management came to dominate management's agenda. He says that, as a result,
[i]t is not surprising that since 1998 earnings restatements have proliferated. This
situation is a far cry from earlier decades when, if my recollection serves me correctly,
firms competed on the basis of which one had the most conservative set of books.
Short-term stock price values then seemed less of a focus than maintaining
unquestioned credit worthiness.
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reforms may be desirable to enhance the independence of analysts, auditors,
and other gatekeepers. Clearly, all gatekeepers are not alike. Thus, the
deterrence story may work better for auditors than for analysts, while in the
case of analysts, structural reforms aimed at increasing the independence of the
gatekeeper may outperform litigation remedies.
5. An International Perspective
Although gatekeepers are universal and found in all systems of corporate
governance, corporate governance itself varies widely around the world. In
particular, the structure of share ownership is polarized between a system of
dispersed ownership that prevails largely in the United States and the United
Kingdom (and some other common law countries) and a system of
concentrated ownership that is prevalent elsewhere. 85  In the dispersed
ownership structure that characterizes the United States and the United
Kingdom, controlling shareholders or controlling blocks are uncommon;
managers have at least relatively greater autonomy as a result;86 and dispersed
shareholders must rely on indirect means, such as equity compensation, to
align managers' self-interests with those of the shareholders. In contrast, in
concentrated ownership systems, there is normally a controlling shareholder
who can directly monitor the firm's management and who thus does not need
to rely on indirect mechanisms, such as equity compensation, to incentivize
management. As a result, Europe has made far less use of stock options and
other forms of equity compensation than has the United States and the United
Kingdom.
A further reason why European corporations have less incentive to manage
for short-term profit maximization is that controlling shareholders seldom, if
ever, sell their control blocks into the market; rather, they sell to an incoming
controlling shareholder in privately negotiated transactions at a control
Id. He goes on to predict that "[a] change in behavior, however, may already be in train."
Id. Specifically, he finds that "perceptions of the reliability of firms' financial statements
are increasingly reflected in yield spreads of corporate bonds" and that other signs of self-
correction are discernible. Id.
85 For an overview of the differences between dispersed and concentrated ownership
systems, see Coffee, supra note 1, at 1. For empirical support, see Rafael La Porta et al.,
Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 491-98 (1999) (establishing that the
majority of the firms in the United Kingdom, the United States, and in Japan are considered
to be widely held as distinguished from the remaining countries critiqued).
86 This relative autonomy is evidenced by the enormous differential between chief
executive compensation in the United States and that in other major economies. According
to a study by Towers Perrin, a compensation consulting firm, chief executive compensation
as a multiple of average employee compensation is 531 times greater in the United States,
but the multiple is only 16 in France, 11 in Germany, 10 in Japan, and 21 in Canada. Even
in Britain, which also has dispersed ownership and uses stock options, chief executive
compensation is only 25 times average employee compensation. See Gretchen Morgenson,
Explaining (or Not) Why the Boss Is Paid So Much, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004, § 3, at 1.
2004]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
premium. As a result, they have less interest in the day-to-day stock price
because it does not determine the price they will receive on such a sale
(whereas managers in the United States and the United Kingdom do sell their
shares at the market price and so are more concerned with maximizing it).
These factors probably explain why there was no corresponding wave of
accounting irregularity cases in Europe when Enron, WorldCom and their
progeny exploded across the American business scene in 2001 and 2002.
Because European managers were less likely to be compensated with equity
and European controlling shareholders had less reason to manage for the short
term, they had far less incentive to "cook the books." To be sure, some
accounting irregularity cases did arise in Europe, but they usually had an
American dimension. Thus, Royal Ahold, the Dutch retailing firm,
experienced a $1.2 billion fraud, but its accounting irregularities were largely
localized within its U.S. Foodservice division.8 7 Similar controversies arose at
Skandia Insurance, a Swedish company, and at Vivendi Universal, a French
company, but both had sought to convert themselves into American-style
conglomerates that made frequent acquisitions and utilized equity
compensation. 88 Most recently, problems (and whistleblowers) at the North
American subsidiary of Adecco, a Swiss Company and the world's largest
employment services company, have triggered another major financial
scandal.8 9 Given this American nexus, European commentators could continue
to dismiss Enron and WorldCom as examples of American "greed," which
would never arise in Europe.90
Then, the Parmalat scandal broke. At least $4.8 billion in cash simply
disappeared from its balance sheet, and approximately $16 billion in net debt
was hidden from the market according to PricewaterhouseCoopers. 91 Unlike
American scandals, the evidence suggests that the fraud had continued for
many years and had been assisted by Parmalat's bankers. The principal
victims were Parmalat's creditors, not its shareholders (indeed, the controlling
17 See Landler, supra note 7 (highlighting that the Royal Ahold, Skandia Insurance, and
Vivendi Universal scandals all possessed "strong American component[s]").
88 Id.
89 See Fionna Fleck, Two Executives Resign at Adecco in Fallout Over Its Accounting,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 17, 2004, at 9; Haig Simonsian, Adecco's Problems are Shrouded
in Mystery, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at 8.
90 See Landler, supra note 7 (quoting a statement by Sophie L'Helias, a French corporate
governance expert, that "Europeans used to say, 'this could never happen here; such greed is
limited to America').
91 See Alessandra Galloni, Scope of Parmalat's Problems Emerges, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27,
2004, at A-3 (detailing the allegedly fraudulent accounting practices reported by
PricewaterhouseCoopers after Parmalat filed for bankruptcy protection); Henry Sender &
Michelle Pacelle, Parmalat Probers Are Likely to Focus on Role of Banks, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 24, 2003, at C-i (emphasizing the level of knowledge of the banks with which
Parmalat engaged in business dealings and their role within the allegedly fraudulent
accounting practices).
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shareholders appear chiefly responsible for the fraud). Yet, while the end goal
of the fraud was different from the typical American scandal, the means used
were similar and involved use of some of the same exotic financial engineering
that characterized Enron's failure. 92  Attorneys, auditors, and investment
bankers have been similarly implicated. In short, gatekeeper failure is now a
recognized problem on both sides of the Atlantic.
93
But it is not the same problem. While Enron, WorldCom, and similar cases
appear to have been driven by managers seeking to inflate earnings and
maximize the stock price, Parmalat looks more like a fraud primarily directed
at creditors and intended to hide the diversion of assets to controlling
shareholders.94 While accounting irregularities in the United States most
commonly involve revenue recognition issues relating to the income statement,
the characteristic problem in a concentrated ownership system is overstated,
fictitious, or diverted assets-in effect, fraud on the balance sheet. In short,
different systems of corporate governance have different vulnerabilities: in a
dispersed ownership system, the typical securities fraud will be management-
engineered and intended to create a short-term stock price spike, while in
concentrated ownership systems, the goal is instead to permit controlling
shareholders to divert "private benefits of control" to themselves. The
common denominator is, however, that gatekeeper acquiescence is necessary
for either form of fraud to be consummated.
II. THE NEAR FUTURE OF GATEKEEPERS: SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE
LOOMING LITIGATION CRISIS
Historically, bubbles are followed by crashes, which, in turn, are followed
by punitive legislation. 95 The 1999-2003 era is fully consistent with this
pattern, and this section will focus on the likely impact of these reforms on
gatekeepers. Still, because the problem of gatekeeper failure is not uniform,
either in its character or intensity, it is important initially to outline the range of
strategies that regulators could follow in response to corporate scandals and
conflicts of interest.
92 See Sender & Pacelle, supra note 91.
9' See John Plender, Problems at Ahold, Parmalat and Now Adecco Raise New Questions
About How Global Accounting Firms Should Work With Multinationals and Risk of Modern
Investment Management Techniques, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at 15 (equating the Enron,
Adecco, and Parmalat scandals, in that "all three raise questions once again about the quality
of audits conducted by the global accounting and professional services firms").
9 See "Parma Splat-Europe's Corporate Governance ", ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 2004
(United States ed.) (noting that the Tanzi family held a majority of Parmalat's voting power
and appears to have diverted assets to itself).
9' For a discussion of this cycle over history, see Banner, supra note 6, at 850-5 1.
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A. A Typology of Conflict of Interest Reforms
A range of well recognized strategies exist for responding to corporate
financial scandals, each of which has well-known precedents. Although other
typologies can undoubtedly be constructed, the following four categories
probably capture most of the realistic regulatory options.
1. Structural Reform
A new body or agency can be created, either public or private, to monitor
conflicts and assure higher quality disclosure. The Securities and Exchange
Commission, created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the wake of
the 1929 market crash, is probably the clearest example of such a response, but
the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB")
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to monitor auditing firms is a modem example that
follows in its wake.96
Structural reforms can also change the obligations of private actors. For
example, the law can create a new gatekeeper. In the 1930s, the federal
securities laws and the SEC effectively made auditors into gatekeepers for the
public (and not just for the clients who retained their services), and to a limited
extent Sarbanes-Oxley has imposed new gatekeeping responsibilities on
attorneys and securities analysts. Part III will suggest that these initial steps
should be generalized.
2. Prophylactic Rules
Fiduciary law has long forbidden some forms of self-dealing between the
fiduciary and the beneficiary. Thus, the trustee cannot transact business with
the trust estate because such transactions are either void or voidable. Over the
course of the twentieth century, American corporate law largely relaxed the
prohibition on self-dealing provided that certain procedures were followed. 97
Offsetting this trend in state law, however, the federal securities laws
introduced new prophylactic prohibitions, including a prohibition on a
corporate officer or director retaining the proceeds of certain forms of short-
term trading in his or her company's stock. 98  Sarbanes-Oxley has now
96 Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act creates the PCAOB as a regulatory body subject to
SEC oversight, and section 101(c) of the Act further directs the PCAOB to "establish or
adopt ... auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to the
preparation of audit reports for" publicly held issuers. 15 U.S.C. § 721 l(c) (2000).
17 For a detailed discussion of the gradual relaxation over the last 150 years of American
corporate law of the once standard prophylactic rule against self-dealing, see Harold Marsh,
Jr., Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW 35 (1966). Essentially, disclosure to, and
approval by, disinterested directors replaced proof of the transaction's intrinsic fairness as
the necessary precondition to sustaining a self-dealing transaction's validity.
98 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates that senior officers,
directors, and ten-percent shareholders of a publicly-held corporation must return to the
corporation any profits they make, or losses they avert, on purchasing and selling the
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introduced similar rules, most notably including a prohibition on a public
company making or arranging for loans to its executives. 99
3. Independence and Empowerment Rules
For the gatekeeper to be an effective monitor of management on behalf of
investors, it must be independent of management. Sarbanes-Oxley recognized
this by transferring all responsibility for the hiring, supervision, retention, and
compensation of the auditor to the audit committee, whose own independence
it also enhanced. 100 Some have argued that this step does not go far enough;
instead, they have proposed procedures by which persons even more
independent than directors would select and hire the independent auditor.
10 1
Although the feasibility of these proposals is debatable, they are an example of
an "empowerment" rule that increases the independence and thus the
monitoring capacity of the gatekeeper.
4. Liability Rules
The standard response to a corporate scandal is to enhance liability rules
either by increasing penalties, eliminating defenses, or creating new private
causes of action. The Securities Act of 1933 is here the classic example, as it
creates virtual strict liability for the corporate issuer if issuer's registration
statement contains a material misstatement or omission. 10 2 Yet, as discussed
below, Sarbanes-Oxley basically did not follow this path except to the extent
that it increased criminal penalties and SEC powers.
corporation's stock in any sequence within six months. This provision is a federal rule
intended to discourage manipulation of the corporation's stock price by insiders. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C.S. § 78p(b) (2003).
" Section 402 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which has been codified as section 13(k) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, forbids public companies "directly or indirectly, ... to
extend or maintain credit, to arrange for the extension of credit, or to renew an extension of
credit, in the form of a personal loan to or for any director or executive officer ... of that
issuer." 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k). This is, in effect, a throwback to the form of strict
prophylactic rule that characterized nineteenth and early twentieth century American
corporate law.
'00 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act mandates that the audit committee "be directly
responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work" of the
independent auditor. This provision has been codified as section 10A(m)(2) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 10A(m)(2).
'01 See Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform: Financial Statement Insurance, and GAAP
Re-Visited, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39 (2002) (proposing that corporations be required to
purchase financial statement insurance and that insurers select the firm's auditors).
'02 Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 creates strict liability for the issuer (but
grants a variety of affirmative defenses to secondary participants) if the registration
statement contains a material misstatement or omission of which the purchaser was
unaware. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(k).
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B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: What It Did and Did Not Do
Passed almost without dissent, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act essentially addresses
the problem of accounting irregularities by shifting control of the accounting
profession from the profession to a new body, the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board ("PCAOB"), which is authorized to regulate the profession,
establish auditing standards, and impose professional discipline. 10 3
Conceptually, this is not a new approach, as the PCAOB's authority largely
parallels that of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") over
securities brokers and dealers. What is new, however, is explicit recognition of
the significance of conflicts of interest because the Act expressly bars auditors
from providing a number of categories of professional services to their audit
clients and further authorizes the PCAOB to prohibit additional categories of
consulting services. 104 To be sure, auditors might still be compromised by the
ability of management to reduce their audit fees or terminate them as the
company's auditor, but Sarbanes-Oxley addresses these concerns by
transferring all control and supervision of the auditor to the audit committee,
whose independence it also enhanced. 10 5 Thus, to the extent that conflicts of
interest compromised auditors, the Act responds with a relevant answer.
Yet, if Enron and similar cases of accounting irregularities were more
caused by the principal than the agent and were the product of the increased
incentive of corporate executives to "cook the books" because of the
temptations created by stock options, then Sarbanes-Oxley is less clearly
responsive to these problems. Nor does it increase the deterrent threat facing
gatekeepers to offset the predictably increased pressure from managements.
For example, except in one minor respect, the Act does not seek to revise or
reverse the PSLRA. 10 6 Finally, the Act never addresses stock options or
103 Section 101(c) of the Act enumerates broad powers, including the authority to
"establish ... auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other standards relating to
the preparation of audit reports for issuers .... " 15 U.S.C. § 721 1(c)(2).
"o4 Section 201 of the Act, which is to be codified as section 10A(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, specifies eight types of professional services that the auditor of a
public company may not perform for its audit client and also authorizes the PCAOB to
prohibit additional services if it determines that they may compromise auditor
independence. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g).
105 Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act gives the audit committee full responsibility
for supervision and compensation of the outside auditor. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text. In addition, section 301 establishes minimum standards for audit
committee members and bars them from accepting "any consulting, advisory or other
compensatory fee from the issuer." See 15 U.S.C. § 10A(m)(3)(B).
106 Section 804 of the Act does extend the statute of limitations for securities fraud suits,
thereby reversing a 1991 Supreme Court decision that had shortened the time period. See
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (lengthening the
statute of limitations for private claims against securities fraud to the earlier of two years
after constructive notice of the violation through unearthing new facts, or five years after the
violation occurred). For a discussion of the previous law thereby reversed, see supra note
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executive compensation, except to the extent that it may require the forfeiture
of such compensation to the corporation if the corporation later restates its
earnings. 07  In short, while the potential benefits from acquiescing in
accounting irregularities appear to have been reduced for auditors, the expected
costs to them from such acquiescence also remain low because the level of
deterrence that they once faced has not been restored. 10 8 Arguably then, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act represents an incomplete response-relevant in its desire
to reduce agent conflicts of interest, but still not sufficient to the extent that
underdeterrance remains the problem. But this assessment must be qualified to
the extent that courts have begun to act on their own to fill this void.
C. The Judicial Response
Any assessment of gatekeeper liability that presupposes that their exposure
to liability has remained constant is probably inaccurate. Although Congress
has been cautious about changing the balance of advantage in civil litigation
involving gatekeepers, a wave of post-Enron jurisprudence is sweeping across
state and federal courts and has already shifted the balance of advantage in
civil litigation significantly in the plaintiff's direction. The most obvious
example of this shift is the decision in late 2002 in In re Enron Corp.
Securities, Derivative & ERISA Litigation,10 9 which seemingly has outflanked
the Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver"10 and largely
restored private "aiding and abetting" liability under a different name. In the
Enron case, the district court denied the motions to dismiss filed by Enron's
auditors, its principal outside law firm, and six major banks, all of whom
asserted that they could not be deemed primary violators and so were immune
from private suit under Central Bank. Adopting the position urged by the SEC
in an amicus curiae brief,"' the court ruled that primary liability could extend
52 and accompanying text.
107 Section 304 of the Act requires the forfeiture of certain bonuses "or other incentive-
based or equity-based compensation" and any stock trading profits received by a chief
executive officer or chief financial officer of an issuer during the twelve-month period
following the filing of an inflated earnings report that is later restated. 15 U.S.C. § 7243.
This does cancel the incentive to inflate earnings and then bail out, but the enforcement
methods applicable to this provision are unspecified and the provision applies only if the
earnings restatement is the product of "misconduct." Ambiguities abound here.
108 Prior to the 1990s, private litigation was a real (and arguably even excessive)
constraining force on auditors, which required them to devote as much as fourteen percent
of their revenues to litigation costs and expenses. See supra note 48 and accompanying text
(discussing the potential exposure to loss of accounting firms resulting from securities fraud
litigation costs).
'09 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
110 Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
177 (1994).
"1 The SEC's amicus brief was largely modeled on a similar brief filed by the SEC (and
initially adopted by the Third Circuit) in Klein v. Boyd, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2004 (3d
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to any person who contributes materially false or misleading information to
persons who it understands to be preparing or drafting a report or press release
to be filed with the SEC or disseminated to the investing public, even though
this peripheral defendant neither solicited sales, participated in the actual
drafting of the document, nor was otherwise identified in the document so filed
or released.1 12 The Enron decision not only rejected the majority rule in the
federal courts, which seems to permit a private suit against the secondary
participant only when the latter makes or authorizes an "attributed statement"
that specifically identifies it and its conclusion, 113 but also went well beyond
the few cases that have allowed primary liability to extend to persons who
"substantially participate" in the drafting of an SEC document. 114 Under the
Enron ruling, most who could formerly be reached under "aiding and abetting"
liability now seemingly can be reached as a "maker" or "creator" of a public
statement. 115
Whether the Enron decision is correct can be (and is being hotly) debated.
But the more relevant point for this article is that the decision seemingly
signals a judicial shift-whether conscious or unconscious-toward imposing
greater liability on gatekeepers. Symptomatically, Enron is not the only recent
post-scandal decision to have expanded the scope of liability for secondary
participants. In a series of decisions involving Lernout & Hauspie, 116 another
federal court has refused to dismiss securities fraud allegations in private class
actions against a variety of secondary defendants, including the firm's outside
directors, auditors, stock analysts, and others. Unlike the Enron court, the
Cir. Feb. 12, 1998), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 4121 (3d
Cir. Mar. 9, 1998).
12 Enron, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 582-91. Judge Harmon added that a defendant "can be a
primary violator if he or she writes misrepresentations for inclusion in a document to be
given to investors, even if the idea for those misrepresentations came from someone else."
Id. at 693 (quoting the SEC's amicus brief).
"I See Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) (requiring that
"the misrepresentation must be attributed to that specific actor at the time of public
dissemination").
114 In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 627 (9th Cir. 1994) (using
"substantial participation" test).
115 For this common assessment, see William Gleeson & Jesse Minier, Financial
Institutions and the Enron Whiplash: The Growing Pain of Rule JOb-5 Liability, 22
BANKING & FINANCIAL SERVICES POLICY REPORT 1 (Feb. 2003). See also Anthony E. Davis,
Professional Responsibility-Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 6, 2003, at 3;
Kurt Eichenwald, Ruling Leaves Most Players Exposed to Suits on Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
21, 2002, at C3; Bart Schwartz & Jonathan Freedman, Aiding and Abetting Liability and
Enron, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 2003, at 5.
116 See In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 286 B.R. 33 (D. Mass. 2002). See also In re
Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 236 F. Supp. 2d 161 (D. Mass. 2003); Bomberg v. SG
Cowen, 236 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2002) (declining to dismiss action against security
analyst who covered the issuer).
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Lernout & Hauspie court did not need to focus on whether the defendant
corporation's audit committee members had substantially participated in the
drafting of SEC reports or press releases. Rather, because each director had
signed the defendant's Form 10-K, the court found this fact alone sufficient to
deem the audit committee members to have made a fraudulent statement. 117
In an even more sweeping conclusion, the court further found that audit
committee members could be held liable as "controlling persons" under section
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Under long-established SEC
rules, "control" "means the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person." 118
Although the Lernout & Hauspie court acknowledged that outside directors
were not inherently "control persons," it relied on an earlier decision to find
that "an outside director and audit committee member who is in a position to
approve a corporation's financial statements can be presumed to have the
'power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies of' the
corporation, at least insofar as the 'management and policies' referred to relate
to ensuring a measure of accuracy in the content of company reports and SEC
registrations that they actually sign." 119 Never discussed by the Lernout &
Hauspie decision was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which, of course, could not
apply retroactively to that case; still, that statute only reinforces this mode of
analysis because it greatly enhances the powers of the audit committee, thus
making its members look even more like "controlling persons." As a result,
audit committee members would now seem significantly more exposed to
personal liability. Finally, although a plaintiff is still required to plead facts
raising a strong inference of fraud, the Lernout & Hauspie court found this last
requirement satisfied by the fact that the audit committee members all
allegedly had known that their corporation lacked an adequate system of
internal controls and that its outside auditor had raised specific problems with
its financial reporting. 120 Again, on this basis, many audit committee members
could be held liable in the near future.
The net impact of these rulings is to substantially heighten the prospective
liability of audit committee members. By signing a periodic report, by helping
to draft such a report, or by acquiring knowledge of adverse facts as a
"controlling person," such a person faces a non-trivial risk of personal liability.
Already, there are signs that the major auditing firms recognize that they face
increased liability and are beginning to internalize new controls and standards
in light of it. 121
117 Lernout & Hauspie, 286 B.R. at 38-40.
118 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2004) (defining term "control").
"9 Lernout & Hauspie, 286 B.R. at 39 (quoting In re Livent, Inc. Noteholders Sec. Litig.,
151 F. Supp. 2d 371, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)); see also In re Reliance Sec. Litig., 135 F. Supp.
2d 480, 518 (D. Del. 2001).
120 Lernout & Hauspie, 286 B.R. at 37-38.
121 See Jonathan Glater, Pricewaterhouse Taking A Stand and A Big Risk, N.Y. TIMES,
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On the state level, -some signs of a similar, if milder, shift toward imposing
heightened responsibilities on directors are also evident in Delaware, where
respected members of its judiciary have called for new legislation and an
expanded meaning to be given to the critical Delaware concept of "good
faith.' 22 These comments have warned that a conflicted director may not be
found to have acted in "good faith." "Good faith" is a key requirement under
Delaware law because, in its absence, a Delaware corporation generally cannot
indemnify an officer or director; 123 in addition, charter provisions eliminating
monetary liability for breach of the duty of care (which most public companies
in the United States now have) are ineffective if the director did not act in
"good faith."'124 Following in the wake of these comments have come a flurry
of recent Delaware decisions that have declined to dismiss derivative actions
and that have otherwise raised the standards for both director independence
and the duty of care.' 25 Outside of Delaware, the trend has been the same, as
plaintiffs have repeatedly won since Enron.126 Although derivative actions are
not the normal mechanism by which liability is asserted against gatekeepers,
Jan. 1, 2003, at CI (noting pledge of PricewaterhouseCoopers to resign as auditors "in any
case where we cannot resolve concerns about the quality of the information we are receiving
or about the integrity of the management teams with whom we are working"). Of course,
from a distance, it is impossible to determine if such assurances are largely self-promotional
or whether they reflect a real change in behavior.
122 See William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming 2003). Mr. Chandler is the Chancellor and
Mr. Strine a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court. See also Tom Becker,
Delaware Judge Warns Boards of Liability for Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at
A-14.
123 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2004) (Delaware corporation has the power to
indenify any person who "acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably
believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation.").
124 See id. § 102(b)(7) (permitting charter provision to eliminate due care liability if
director acted in "good faith").
125 See, e.g., In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(deeming directors not to be independent of an academic colleague or a university
contributor); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(deeming allegations sufficient to assert cause of action that board's action in approving
compensation and non-fault termination of Michael Ovitz, a senior officer, was not taken in
good faith); In re HealthSouth Corp. S'holders Litig., 2003 WL 22769045 (Del. Ch. Nov.
24, 2003) (refusing to dismiss or stay derivative raising insider trading claims); In re Pure
Resources, Inc. S'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (finding tender by
controlling shareholder to be coercive).
126 See, e.g., In re Abbott Lab. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir.
2003) (derivative action for "conscious inaction" in face of potentially illegal corporate
activities reinstated and demand futility test simplified); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 817-
19 (6th Cir. 2001) (derivative action reinstated where plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a
sustained failure by board to exercise appropriate attention).
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both the holdings and dicta in these recent cases have upgraded the level of
care and attention that courts are expecting all corporate fiduciaries to exercise.
In short, all the judicial straws in the wind point towards a higher risk of
liability, although, for the present, the principal target of this new litigation
appears to be directors, rather than gatekeepers.
A focus on individual cases, particularly at the lower court level, can be
criticized for its reliance on anecdotal evidence whose ultimate impact remains
speculative. But aggregate data also indicates that the risk for gatekeepers is
real and growing. Here, the most telling statistic is the rising settlement value
of securities litigation. According to one recent survey, which extended
through mid-2003, the average value of securities class action settlement has
risen steadily since the mid 1990s: 127
Year Average Settlement
1996-2000 (excluding Cendant settlement) $14.2 million
2001 $17.7 million
2002 $19.9 million
2003 (through 8/21/03) $25.1 million
Compounding this rising settlement value is the additional fact that the number
of securities class actions also appears to be rising, if more modestly.128
Averages can be misleading. The real fear of the major auditing firms is
that of one catastrophic loss that exceeds their total insurance and other
reserves. Such a loss could not be offset by increasing client fees and would
result in likely insolvency. Here, it is relevant that the six largest recoveries
against audit firms have all occurred since 2000:129
127 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, supra note 56, at 2.
128 Excluding very specialized "laddering" and "analyst" cases, some 217 securities class
actions were filed in 2002, up from 207 in 1999, 201 in 2000, and 176 in 2001 (when over
300 "laddering" cases were, however, filed), but down from 1998 when 258 cases were
filed. Id. at 1-2. From 1996 to 2001, securities class actions averaged 186 cases per year.
Id. at 2. Hence, the recent total has been up, but only after some adjustments are made to
the data.
129 In compiling this list, I have relied on data made available to me by the firm of
Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach, for whom I served as an expert witness during
the Rite Aid litigation. The principal cases on this list are, however, a matter of public
record. See In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F. 3d 286, 294 (3d Cir. 2001) (approving $335
million settlement by Ernst & Young and $2.85 billion settlement by Cendant); In re Rite
Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 269 F. Supp. 2d 603, 611 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (approving $125 million
settlement by KPMG); News in Brief: $300 Million Oxford Settlement Approved, N.Y. L.J.,
June 19, 2003, at 1 (noting that Oxford Health would pay $225 million and KPMG $75
million). Arthur Andersen's involvement in the Waste Management, Sunbeam, and Baptist
Foundation of America litigation is all concisely summarized in In re Enron Corp. Sec.
Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549, 675-76 n.109-11 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (noting that Andersen paid
$110 million to settle in the Sunbeam class action in 2001 and $217 million to settle the
Baptist Foundation litigation in 2002).
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Name of Case Year Settlement Amt. Firm
1. Cendant 2000 $335 million Ernst & Young
2. Baptist Foundation ofAm. 2002 $217 million Andersen
3. Rite Aid 2002 $125 million KPMG
4. Sunbeam 2001 $110 million Andersen
5. Waste Management I 2000 $75 million Andersen
6. Oxford Health 2003 $75 million KPMG
Had Andersen not ceased operations following its criminal conviction, its
Enron liabilities might easily have exceeded Ernst & Young's record
settlement in Cendant. In any event, the risk of catastrophic loss, not the
increase in average settlement value, is the factor most likely to cause the
market for gatekeeper services to unravel.
Although auditors continue to be sued only in the minority of securities
class actions, the number of securities class actions naming auditors as
defendants has also recently risen, climbing to 34 cases in 2002 (up 21% over
the 1998-2001 period and up 89% over 2001).130 For the future, the most
ominous fact may be that accounting irregularities tend increasingly to be the
primary focus of securities class actions. 131 The more actions filed against
auditors, the greater the chance of a catastrophic judgment.
D. The Prospective Litigation Impact of Reform
Little agreement exists about the overall impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
on civil litigation. Some critics have viewed it as more rhetoric than serious
reform; 132 others contend that it is a sweeping intrusion into the existing U.S.
system of corporate governance. Both perspectives miss, however, what it
most important: Sarbanes-Oxley ushers in and accelerates a major and
probably inevitable transition, which will move us from a rules-based system
of financial disclosure to a principles-based system. In contrast to Europe, the
United States has long relied on a rules-based system in which generally
accepted accounting principles (or "GAAP") were precise, technical, and
130 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, LLP, supra note 56, at 7-8. This represented 34 out
of 217 total securities class actions filed in that year (or 16%). Id. at 8. In contrast, the
number of securities class actions brought against auditors declined from 1998 to 2001. See
id. at 7. Still, the highest number of such actions against auditors over the past five years
was 39 in 1998. Id. at 8.
131 Over 50% of the securities class actions settled between the passage of the PSLRA
and December 31, 2002 appear to have involved accounting irregularities and over 60%
involved a restatement of financials. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN,
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS
REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2002 at 9 (2003), available at
http://www.comerstone.com/framres.html (last accessed Mar. 12, 2004).
132 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light
Reform (and It Might Just Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003).
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limited. Typically, these narrow rules afforded safe harbors from liability for
issuers and gatekeepers. In contrast, European accounting principles were
broader, more generalized, and sometimes indefinite to the point of being
ineffable. As discussed below, Europe could live with this imprecision
because Europe is characterized by a relatively low rate of litigation, and thus
its issuers did not need to fear American-style entrepreneurial litigation.
Precisely for this reason, however, a shift to a principles-based system
exposes American issuers and their gatekeepers to a substantially heightened
threat of liability. At the core of a principles-based system is the notion that
the issuer must not only comply with GAAP, but must make a "fair
presentation" that provides a full, fair, and holistic picture of the issuer's
financial condition and results of operations. In sections 302 and 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress directed the chief executive officer and chief
financial officer of every publicly held company to certify in every periodic
report filed with the SEC "that information contained in the periodic report
'fairly presents,' in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of the issuer." 133 This concept of "fair presentation" is not limited
by any reference to GAAP, and compliance with GAAP is clearly not
dispositive of whether the issuer has provided a "fair presentation." Instead,
the standard seems to intend that the issuer provide full and fair disclosure in
the form of a holistic picture of the company that reveals all material financial
weaknesses, even if their disclosure were not required by GAAP.
Historically, this concept of "fair presentation" was the standard prescribed
by Judge Henry Friendly for the Second Circuit in United States v. Simon.134
Although Simon has never been reversed or even called into question, it had
over recent years seemingly become a forgotten decision, honored more in the
breach than in the observance. 135 Virtually overnight, however, Enron and
related scandals have resuscitated Simon's concept of "fair presentation." The
reason for its revival is obvious: Enron showed beyond argument that a rules-
133 The quoted language is from section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a penal code
provision. Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 906, 116 Stat. 745, 806 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
1350). Section 302 of Sarbanes-Oxley Act uses slightly different language: "the financial
statements, and other financial information included in the report, fairly presents in all
material respects the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer as of, and for,
the periods presented in the report." Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7241). No difference in scope or meaning seems intended by this
slight difference in phrasing.
134 25 F.2d 796, 807-09 (2d Cir. 1969).
135 I have been unable to find any circuit court decision in the past twenty years that cites
the Simon case in a decision upholding civil or criminal liability for securities fraud. The
decision has, however, been cited by dissenting judges who believed that a case should not
have been dismissed or overturned. See, e.g., In re K-Tel Int'l Sec. Litig., 300 F.3d 881,
906 (8th Cir. 2002). The last published decision citing it in a decision favoring private
plaintiffs or the SEC appears to have been SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 677 F.2d 1301, 1313
(9th Cir. 1982).
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based system of financial disclosure could be gamed and distorted to the point
that investors could have little confidence in it. Even if newer and tighter rules
were drafted, practitioners would predictably stay one step ahead of regulators
by finding new ways to game and evade narrow and specific rules. As a result,
Congress and the SEC framed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's new certification
requirements in terms of the Simon case, and in interpreting this new
requirement, the SEC has cited Simon for the proposition that "[p]resenting
financial information in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles may not necessarily satisfy obligations under the antifraud provision
of the federal securities laws." 136
While this shift to a principles-based system is obviously consistent with the
public's post-Enron mood, it poses significant risks for issuers and
gatekeepers. Cases that might have been dismissed on summary judgment
now seem more likely to survive because the claim that full and fair disclosure
was not provided is hard to resolve pre-trial. More importantly, the shift to a
principles-based system reduces the prospect that the auditor can truly "audit"
the more ineffable style of disclosure that such a system invites. Finally, this
shift underlines the differences between the European and the American legal
environment. Lacking class actions, contingent fees, or the "American rule"
that generally precludes fee-shifting against the plaintiff, Europe experiences
little securities litigation and hence can tolerate abstract generality in the
formulation of its accounting rules. In contrast, U.S. issuers are likely to
encounter greater difficulty in any transition to accounting principles framed in
broad brush strokes. The combination of broad disclosure obligations and a
legal environment that encourages class litigation means both a higher volume
of litigation and higher settlement values to claims against gatekeepers and
outside directors.
Nonetheless, this transition appears inevitable, not only because of recent
scandals, but because of globalization as well. Globalization necessitates a
common, worldwide accounting language. Under their "Norwalk Treaty," the
Financial Accounting Standards Board ("FASB") and the International
Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") are committed to developing
international accounting standards that both U.S. and European regulators will
accept. 137 Europe has little interest in moving towards a rule-based regime,
and the FASB cannot credibly push in this direction after Enron. As a result,
the development of a common global accounting language will likely finish
what Enron started: namely, the demise of a rules-based system.
136 See SEC Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports,
Exchange Act Release No. 33-8124, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,276, 57,279 n.55 (Sept. 9, 2002).
137 The two bodies-the FASB and the IASB-announced in October 2002 that they
were committed to achieving convergence between their respective accounting standards by
2005 with an initial exposure draft being scheduled for late 2003. See Convergence of
Global Accounting Standards; Regulatory Watch, ACCT. TODAY, Jan. 25, 2003, at 512
(describing memorandum of understanding between the two bodies).
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So where do these trends leave us? The original issue was what level of
legal threat would optimize deterrence. Too high a level of liability may cause
the contemporary markets for gatekeeping services to fail, and too low a level
invites future Enrons. This recognition has two implications that inform Part
III. First, public policy should attempt to focus liability rules so that they
incentivize gatekeepers to search diligently for fraud and irregularity but do not
employ excess deterrence that threatens gatekeeper solvency. In this light, it
will next be argued that a combination of stricter liability standards with a
ceiling on damages represents a sensible compromise that is superior to an
existing liability regime that both (a) predicates liability upon proof of scienter,
and (b) sometimes immunizes even the intentional aider and abetter. Second,
to the extent that some gatekeepers lack the ability to detect frauds by their
clients, strict liability is an inappropriate legal standard, and other types of
legal rules-structural, prophylactic and empowering-merit greater attention
and should be blended into any overall policy response. The shift to a
principles-based system aggravates this problem because it makes it more
problematic whether the auditor can truly prevent fraud or irregularity as the
principles of financial reporting become more open-ended and ambiguous.
III. THE FUTURE GATEKEEPER: REMEDIES FOR GATEKEEPER FAILURE
Three linked problems dominate any attempt to redefine the role or
restructure the obligations and liabilities of market gatekeepers.
First, in striking an appropriate balance between excessive liability and an
inadequate legal threat, public policy must recognize the peculiarly American
dimensions of this problem. The market for auditing services has become
increasingly concentrated in the United States (and in consequence around the
world, as most global corporations are either American or follow similar norms
and standards). The ironic truth is that the four global accounting firms that
remain today have become "too big to fail." In addition, the threat of
excessive liability is also a uniquely American problem because the prospect of
large class actions and jury decisionmaking is almost unique to the American
legal system.
Second, public policy must seek to minimize the perverse incentives that
induce the gatekeeper not to investigate too closely. For example, in securities
litigation against auditors, the defense is frequently raised by the auditors that
they were deceived by corrupt managements on whom they had justifiably
relied. Often, this may be true, but it can still create an incentive not to inquire
too closely-lest one acquire information that should place one on notice.
More generally, the PSLRA requires a particularized pleading at the outset of
the case that gives rise to a "strong inference of fraud."'1 38 In the case of
138 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 21D(b)(2), 109
Stat. 737 (1995) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2000)) (requiring complaint to "state
with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind").
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accountants, this standard means that more than reckless indifference must be
shown and as of the very outset of the action, when typically little is known
about the accountant's involvement. As a result, the auditor who remains
ignorant of the fraud, even though recklessly inattentive, probably escapes
liability.
But how much can we realistically expect of the auditor? Auditors have
long argued that there is an "expectations gap" between what the public wants
them to do and their actual capacity. 139 This expectations gap is greatest, they
assert, when it comes to the ability of auditors to detect fraud or illegal acts. 140
Of course, any profession has a collective self-interest in reducing its own risk
of liability or public criticism. Still, independent observers agree that some
elements of financial statements are simply "not verifiable" and could not
accurately be audited by even the most diligent and well-motivated
accountant. 141 To this extent, an undiluted regime of strict liability could be
counter-productive.
Third, public policy must also strike an acceptable balance between the
obligation of client loyalty and the role of protecting the integrity of the
market. This is the unique problem associated with asserting that securities
attorneys owe gatekeeper obligations-either legal or ethical-to investors, as
well as to their clients. Defenders of the traditional advocacy role of the
lawyer find this conflict unbridgeable and argue that imposing gatekeeper
obligations on attorneys will simply "dry up" the free flow of information
between attorney and client, thus possibly resulting in greater illegality. This
section finds this claim to be unsupportable. Rather, it concludes that the
primary consequence of imposing gatekeeper obligations on attorneys will be
to increase their leverage over their clients.
A. Striking the Balance on Liability
Recent commentators have divided over whether gatekeepers should be held
strictly liable for client misconduct. 142 Both sides in this debate recognize the
139 For an overview of asserted "expectations gap," see Carl Pacini et al., At the Interface
of Law and Accounting: An Examination of a Trend Toward a Reduction In the Scope of
Auditor Liability to Third Parties in the Common Law Countries, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 171,
215-17 (2000) (discussing the "expectations gap"); see also Brenda Porter, An Empirical
Study of the Audit Expectation-Performance Gap, 24 ACCT. & Bus. RESEARCH 49 (1993).
140 Over 70% of investors questioned in one survey expected absolute assurance that
material misstatements due to fraud would be detected. See Marc Epstein & Marshall
Geiger, Investor Views of Audit Assurance: Recent Evidence of the Expectation Gap, J.
AcCT., Jan. 1994, at 60.
141 See Ronen, supra note 101, at 41. Professor Ronen objects that generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP") contain many elements that are "simply not auditable." Id.
Applying an undiluted regime of strict liability to such principles would be of little value,
but would risk market failure.
142 Professor Partnoy has proposed such a strict liability regime for underwriters,
auditors, and attorneys in light of Enron. See Partnoy, supra note 9, at 492. To the contrary,
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advantages of strict liability over negligence liability: (1) strict liability gives
the gatekeeper greater incentive to take precautions and exercise due diligence;
(2) strict liability induces the gatekeeper to limit its level of activity, for
example, by rejecting overly risky corporations as clients; and (3) strict
liability spares both courts and regulators the need to descend into the
Serbonian bog of defining precise standards of care, thereby reducing
transaction costs and increasing predictability. 143 Obviously, under a strict
liability system, gatekeepers would raise their fees to cover their increased
liability, but even this increase can be presented as one of the attractions of this
approach because it forces the client to bear a higher fee precisely to the extent
that it cannot convince its auditor that it presents a low risk of fraud or
irregularity. In a perfect market, the issuer would thus bear the expected social
cost of the fraud, which would, in turn, imply that the only issuers that could
access the market would be "those for whom the value of the public financing
exceeds the harm caused by fraud." 144 Put more simply, very high audit fees
should tend to deter the fraudulent actor.
Although possibly optimal in theory, enormous problems surround imple-
mentation of any such proposal. First, as even its proponents acknowledge, the
gatekeeper may not be able to distinguish ex ante the "honest" client from the
"fraudulent" one. Hence, it will charge both a single common fee but a much
higher one. Predictably, this inflated fee structure would still allow the
"fraudulent" client to access the market, but it might drive many honest clients
from the market.145 Even if we relax this assumption and assume that some
broad risk classifications could be made, it still remains true that, to the extent
these classifications are broad and general, then some clients within each
category will pay too little and others too much.
Moreover, the increase in audit fees might have to be enormous in order to
enable auditors to survive under a regime of strict liability. During the
collapse of the high tech bubble in 2000 and 2001, the market value of publicly
held firms audited by the then Big Five fell by over $1 trillion. 146 Under a
Assaf Hamdani, has argued that strict liability would be excessive. See Hamdani, supra
note 10, at 114.
143 See Hamdani, supra note 10, at 59; Partnoy, supra note 9, at 514.
144 See Hamdani, supra note 10, at 60. These observations are not original to these
authors. Conventional "law and economics" analysis sees strict liability as superior to
negligence-based liability in two respects: first, strict liability gives the principal actors
optimal incentives to comply with legal requirements, while freeing courts from the need to
make imperfect and error-prone liability determinations, and second, it induces the principal
actors to adopt an optimal level of activity. See STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
ACCIDENT LAW 5-18 (1987).
145 This "adverse selection" problem can result in a "lemons market" that causes the
honest company to leave the market. See George Akerlot, The Market for "Lemons
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 496-97 (1970).
146 One survey of thirty-three public firms that restated their earnings finds that
companies audited by the Big Five fell in value by roughly $1.3 trillion. See Stephen Taub,
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strict liability regime, the auditor would be jointly and severally liable for this
amount with the issuer, at least if a material misrepresentation or omission and
loss causation were shown. To protect itself against such exposure, the auditor
would need to charge a fee that funded its expected liability costs-which loss
could potentially reach multi-billion dollar sums. 147 Not only would corporate
clients be unable to pay such an amount, but they would predictably oppose
such a fee increase with sufficient vigor as to make the adoption of strict
liability politically infeasible.
Given the risk of being rendered insolvent by a single client, some auditors
also might simply cease to offer auditing services, concentrating instead on
consulting services or simply on providing bookkeeping services without the
provision of any certification. If some firms were to exit, replacements might
well enter. But in all likelihood, new entrants would be smaller, risk-preferring
"fly-by-night" firms that might seek to charge very high fees for the short term
and then liquidate on an adverse judicial determination. Increasingly, audit
firms would seek to protect their partners' assets by minimizing their capital
investments in their firms and by use of limited liability organizational forms,
such as the limited liability company or limited partnership. Even if auditor
exit from the market were deemed a remote risk, it is a virtual certainty that
heightened liability would cause existing auditors to be far more selective in
the public companies that they would accept as clients. Although this might
desirably result in some "lawless" corporation being denied access to public
markets, auditors lack the ability to distinguish ex ante the "law-abiding" client
from the "lawless" one; hence, some "law-abiding" firms would be denied
access to the market with a resulting social loss. Some recent evidence
suggests that this screening process may already have intensified 48 and that
Big Five Get Low Grades For Performance (July 12, 2002), at http://www.cfo.com/
Article?article=7445 (last accessed Mar. 12, 2004) (noting fall from $1.8 trillion to only
$527 billion in market capitalization).
147 Of course, securities class actions today settle for a fraction of their asserted losses.
But this fraction will certainly rise (and steeply) if we moved to a strict liability regime.
Even today, neutral third parties have placed the likely settlement value of some outstanding
securities class actions at $1 billion or higher. See Martin Peers, Suits Cloud AOL's
Optimism: Cost of Settling Holder Litigation May Hurt Effort to Cut Debt, WALL ST. J.,
May 1, 2003, at B2 (estimating settlement cost of securities class action against AOL Time
Warner Inc. at $1 billion).
148 In 2003, over 1460 public companies changed auditors, which was the highest
number in at least five years. Although such switches could be because the client was
dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor considered the client too
risky-or because the auditor raised its fees in light of that increased risk. This
phenomenon of auditor switching affected over one-third of the firms in the Russell 3000,
which covers most smaller market capitalization firms. See Matt Krantz, More Firms Part
Way With Auditors: Shuffling Expected to Pick Up, Casting Doubt on Accounting, USA
TODAY, Feb. 9, 2004, at lB. By itself, this evidence may not prove that auditors are
becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it is at least consistent with
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audit fees are rising dramatically. 149
Finally, there still remains the possibility of litigation error. Even under a
regime of strict liability, it would still be necessary to show that the issuer
made a material misrepresentation or omission before the auditor could be held
vicariously liable. 150 Given the potential of stock price drops resulting in
damages in the multi-billion dollar range, this means that litigation errors could
easily be bankrupting to the auditor, which, in turn, means that the auditor
would be under great pressure to settle such litigation. Such pressure, in turn,
exacerbates the problem of "extortionate" or "frivolous" litigation. Stock
prices can fall for a variety of reasons that are unrelated to fraud or
misrepresentation. Yet, if the stock price decline is great enough, an almost
irresistible incentive arises for the plaintiff's attorney to sue, as it has now been
freed from the burden of alleging, pleading, or proving fraud or scienter.
Hence, the prospect of "frivolous" or "extortionate" litigation increases in
direct proportion to the degree to which one moves toward a strict liability
regime.
B. Designing a "Stricter" Liability Approach: A Proposal
For all these reasons, the "real world" issue becomes whether a second-best
substitute can be devised for a strict liability regime that sidesteps or
minimizes the foregoing problems. In this article's view, the most direct and
practical means to this end would be to convert the gatekeeper into the
functional equivalent of an insurer, who would back its auditor's certification
with an insurance policy that was capped at a realistic level. 151 As a result, the
gatekeeper's liability would be divorced from any showing of fault, but it
would also be limited to a level that achieves adequate deterrence without
causing the market for gatekeeping services to unravel.
such a hypothesis.
149 Audit fees appear to have increased "by as much as 30% or more this year." See
Deborah Salomon & Cassell Bryan-Low, Companies Complain About Cost of Corporate-
Governance Rules, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2004, at A-1. This increase could be because of
the increased compliance costs of Sarbanes-Oxley, as this story implies, or it could also be
attributable in part to the increased risk and litigation exposure faced by auditors, which
they need to pass back to their clients.
150 In addition, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove loss causation, as
otherwise in its absence the plaintiff would receive a seeming windfall. Thus, some
complex litigation issues will still remain.
"I Professor Joshua Ronen has offered a somewhat similar idea that does not combine
the two roles of auditor and insurer but does integrate them. Under his proposal, public
firms would purchase financial statement insurance from insurers, who would then select
the auditors. See Ronen, supra note 101, at 48. Among the problems with this proposal is
the danger that the insurer might prefer that the auditor hide, rather than reveal, accounting
irregularities discovered after the insurance policy was issued, if their revelation would
trigger its obligation to pay under its policy. Still, Professor Ronen has properly recognized
the close connection between auditing and insurance.
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Under this approach, for example, if the corporate client were found liable
for $100 million, then the auditor would have to contribute toward that liability
up to the amount of its policy. The one mandatory element in this proposal
would be a minimum floor on the gatekeeper's insurance policy that would
have to equal some adequate multiple of the highest annual revenues received
by the gatekeeper from its client over the last several years. For purposes only
of illustration, let us assume a multiplier of ten. Now, on the facts of the Enron
case, where it has been widely reported that Arthur Andersen received roughly
$52 million from Enron in its final year, Andersen's liability would be not less
than $520 million (i.e., $52 million times ten). This is a large number, but it
does not approach the roughly $80 billion loss in market capitalization that
Enron experienced and for which Andersen conceivably could be held liable
under a strict liability regime. In a more typical case, where the auditor
receives only a $2 million audit fee from the client, the damages would be
reduced to only $20 million. Hence, the market for gatekeeping services could
easily function under this proposal. It can be debated whether the auditor
should be able to purchase insurance to cover this exposure, but to the extent it
is permitted to pass along this added insurance cost on to its clients, it would
automatically increase the minimum required floor on its policy under the
above mandatory 10:1 ratio between minimum liability and revenues from the
client.
Some will recognize this proposal as bearing considerable resemblance to
Professor Partnoy's modified strict liability proposal.1 52 Under his innovative
proposal, the client and the gatekeeper would contract for the gatekeeper to
bear a minimum percentage of the issuer's losses, possibly subject to a
requirement that the gatekeeper must bear some "specified minimum
percentage." 153 For sake of illustration, assume that the minimum percentage
set by Congress in an amendment to the federal securities laws were 5%. If so,
on the earlier Enron example, Andersen would be required to pay 5% of
Enron's estimated $80 billion decline in market capitalization, or $4 billion.
Essentially three practical differences distinguish these two similar
proposals: (1) Professor Partnoy's system is essentially contractual, while this
proposal is essentially regulatory; (2) Professor Partnoy uses a percentage of
the total damages as his minimum floor, while this proposal uses a multiple of
the gatekeeper's highest annual revenues from the client; and (3) while the
potential damages, as calculated under Professor Partnoy's proposal, could
152 See Partnoy, supra note 9, at 540-46 (offering a modified strict liability proposal as an
improvement over current due diligence-based approaches); see also Stephen Choi, Market
Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916, 951-59 (1998). Professor Choi appears to
have been the first to suggest that the issuer and the gatekeeper should contract over the
share of the gatekeeper's liability for the losses experienced by the issuer's investors.
153 Partnoy, supra note 9, at 540. Actually, Professor Partnoy does not clearly insist that
there be a minimum floor placed on the auditor's liability below which they could not
deviate by agreement but notes that Congress could impose such a minimum percentage. Id.
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often bankrupt the gatekeeper, bankruptcy would rarely follow when a multiple
of the revenues from the client generated the required minimum floor on the
gatekeeper's insurance obligation. Thus, on reflection, the relevant profession
might actually support this proposal, once it recognized that its existing
exposure to liability was even higher. The proposal thus falls (if only barely)
within the range of political feasibility.
This proposal's refusal to accept private contracting (in contrast to Professor
Partnoy, who relies primarily on contracting and disclosure) is based on three
considerations. First, the market for services in some gatekeeping professions
(most notably, auditing) is extremely concentrated, and thus conscious
parallelism in the pricing behavior of the few actors in the industry becomes
likely. Put more simply, if there are only four major auditing firms at present,
it becomes unlikely that they would compete vigorously and accept liability
significantly above any minimum required threshold. Hence, it is simpler to
specify that threshold (but also permit the parties to provide by contract for
even greater liability). Second, in a bubble, investors might not care that their
gatekeepers were accepting only a minimum liability, and thus the disclosure
of the contract between the gatekeeper and the market might have too little
impact on the market to be an adequate deterrent. Third, a contractual
approach overlooks that the corporate client may have little incentive to
bargain for high liability on the part of the auditor. Not only will higher
auditor liability not meaningfully reduce the liability of the client (given the
typical relative disparity in their assets), but corporate managers may actually
want the auditor to have a low ceiling on its liability in order to make it easier
to induce the auditor to acquiesce in risky accounting practices favored by
management. Put more simply, if management wants to inflate earnings in
order to maximize the value of their stock options, the lower the liability faced
by their auditors, the easier it will be for management to convince them to
acquiesce in dubious accounting policies.
The key conceptual difference between the two proposals involves this
proposal's more explicit adoption of a deterrence framework. Prior proposals
for making the auditor an insurer have relied on a tort law rationale, which tries
to force the tortfeasor to internalize the social costs of its actions by making it
pay a higher fee. Neither Professor Partnoy's proposal nor the proposal made
here compels the auditor to internalize the full costs of the issuer's fraud, but to
the extent that Partnoy's proposal would often lead to higher damages, it
should encourage greater precaution and more monitoring. To that same
extent, his proposal would also lead to a greater risk of market failure, either
because auditing firms would become insolvent, exit the market, or cease to
offer their services to deserving clients. While the relative balance of costs and
benefits may seem indeterminate, the real issue is how much additional
incentive do auditors need to monitor optimally? Deterrence is excessive to
the extent it serves only to shift losses from the issuer to the auditor without
reducing the risk of fraud. To the extent that auditor acquiescence in fraud is
willful, one can deter it simply by eliminating the expected gain. Under
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standard deterrence theory, prevention simply requires that the expected
punishment cost exceed the expected gain.154 Professor Partnoy's proposal to
use a percentage of the issuer's losses as the minimum floor on contracting
does not bear any functional relationship to the expected gain; nor does it
increase the penalty to compensate for the limited risk of detection.
If one believes that auditors have not been aware of their clients' stretching
of "generally accepted accounting principles" and have been more negligent
than willful, then higher penalties approaching the total social loss caused by
the auditors' conduct (and not merely exceeding the expected gain to them)
could be justified. This might lead one to prefer Professor Partnoy's proposal,
which is at least related to the total social loss. Ironically, the more one
believes that gatekeeper failure was the product of negligence rather than
fraud, the stronger the case becomes for harsher penalties. At least politically,
however, this is a hard argument to make because greater penalties are being
visited upon the less culpable.
In any event, my intuition is that, at least in the leading recent scandals, the
auditors have been sufficiently aware of the ongoing risks posed by their
clients that penalties focused simply on canceling any expected gain to the
auditor from its involvement with the clients would suffice. But even if one
disagrees and believes that typically the auditor did not know, there is a further
problem with Professor Partnoy's proposal: many aspects of GAAP principles
may simply not be "auditable." 155 If so, additional deterrence is excessive
because it cannot reduce the overall social loss.
Obviously, this article's proposal of stricter liability with a lower ceiling
based on a multiple of the revenues from the client will typically (but not
inevitably) result in lesser liability than under the Partnoy proposal.1 56 Yet, it
still eliminates any intentional incentive to acquiesce in fraud and gives the
gatekeeper considerable incentive to utilize all monitoring controls (including
closer monitoring of its own agents) that are reasonably likely to reduce the
prospect of fraud or earnings manipulation. Above all, this approach prevents
'i See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. EcON. 169 (1968) (utilizing economic theories to develop optimal approaches to
combating illegal behavior).
155 See Ronen, supra note 101, at 41 (postulating that financial statement elements should
be separated into two groups: those that are auditable, and those that are not).
156 To illustrate the difference between the two proposals, consider a very large issuer
that experiences a sudden $50 billion decline in its market capitalization as the result of
accounting irregularities. Assume further that the issuer's auditor had received only $10
million in fees and that Professor Partnoy would limit the auditor's exposure to 10% of the
total loss (or $5 billion). Thus, in this situation, there is a 500:1 ratio between the auditor's
projected liability ($5 billion or 10% of the losses) and its own gain ($10 million). This
represents over-deterrence-unless one thinks there is less than a 1% chance of detection.
In even a minimally efficient market, however, the prospect of detection of accounting
irregularities seems far higher than that. In contrast, this article would impose a ceiling on
auditor liability on these facts at $100 million (or 10 times its gain).
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the market for gatekeeping services from unraveling.
How strict need a stricter system of liability be? Here, we enter the thicket
of political realism. Pure strict liability might be the best rule, but it is
probably not politically acceptable to auditors, who represent a powerful
political lobby. Nor does it seem politically defensible to favor the imposition
of a significantly higher standard of liability on the auditor than on its client,
the issuer. In this light, the highest standard of liability that might be
politically attainable in the case of auditors would likely be that set forth
already for auditors in section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which requires
the auditor as an expert to prove as an affirmative defense that the auditor
"had, after reasonable investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did
believe" that its statement were true. 157 In effect, the burden would be shifted
to the auditor in all Rule 1Ob-5 actions to prove its non-negligence and good
faith belief in its statements.
C. Implementing the Gatekeeper Role ofAttorneys
The foregoing proposal for "stricter liability" has been primarily framed
with auditors in mind. But should it apply to other gatekeepers, such as, for
example, attorneys or securities analysts? Because the economic case for strict
liability assumes both that the gatekeeper can prevent misconduct by investing
more resources in precaution and that the gatekeeper can pass on its increased
costs to the principal, some basic distinctions need to be recognized about
gatekeepers. Some are more able than otfiers to prevent and detect
misconduct. While the auditor inhabits a relatively precise and rule-bound
world, the securities analyst is essentially a prognosticator whose predictions
about the future are frequently wrong. Thus, imposing strict liability on the
securities analyst, given the analyst's necessarily higher rate of error, may
amount to a virtual death sentence for the analyst. In addition, the analyst
cannot pass on its higher exposure to liability to its client in the form of higher
fees because the analyst is not paid by the corporate issuer (but rather by
investors through brokerage commissions). If brokerage commissions were
increased, investors simply would turn to discount brokers (or others) who did
not use securities analysts.
The case of the attorney forces us to focus on still other differences. First,
functionally, attorneys act only occasionally as gatekeepers, certifying or
verifying information for investors, while auditors perform this function
primarily (and increasingly exclusively). Second, the role of gatekeeper
arguably conflicts with the more typical roles performed by attorneys as either
advocates or transaction engineers for their clients. Third, asking attorneys to
serve as gatekeepers may dry up the flow of confidential information between
attorney and client, thereby jeopardizing the ability of the attorney to serve the
client. Based on these premises, the bar (and its academic defenders) have
vehemently argued that, if the attorney were compelled to serve as a watchdog
157 Securities Act of 1933, § 1 l(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B) (2000).
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instead of as an advocate or transaction engineer for the client, the client could
no longer depend on the attorney as a zealous advocate or transaction
engineer. 58
Although this debate has generated much heat, little empirical light has been
focused on just what could be reasonably expected if attorneys were subjected
to a "noisy withdrawal" standard. Yet, one natural experiment exists that does
shed useful light on this question. In 1995, as part of the PSLRA, Congress
added section 10A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which requires
auditors to report to the SEC likely illegal acts that have a material impact on
the issuer's financial statement that an auditor discovers during the course of
an audit unless the issuer takes appropriate remedial action to remedy them. 159
This is the functional equivalent of the noisy withdrawal requirement that the
SEC has proposed (but not adopted) for securities attorneys.160 The existence
of this provision raises the obvious question: what has been the experience
under it? The short answer is that not much has happened. A 2003 report by
the GAO finds that over the period between when section 10A became
effective for fiscal years beginning after January 1, 1996 through May 15,
2003, the SEC received a grand total of twenty-nine section 10A reports from
auditors. 161 Yet, section 10A's enactment was not resisted by the auditing
profession, which instead viewed the section as part of a highly desirable
political compromise that would secure it litigation protection through the
enactment of other provisions of the PSLRA.
From such evidence, it seems a fair inference that attorneys would be even
less likely to report misconduct to the SEC under an SEC rule requiring "noisy
withdrawal." After all, auditors are expected to audit and report damaging
information, while such reporting runs counter to the professional culture of
attorneys. This conclusion does not mean that attorneys should not be asked to
perform a gatekeeping role but rather that, to be effective, such an obligation
must be placed in a context whereby the attorney is playing a clearly defined
"I For a detailed exposition of the argument that the roles of the attorney and the
gatekeeper are essentially inconsistent and that attorneys make poor informational and
reputational intermediaries, see Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for
Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1097, 1097 (2003) (arguing that
requiring the attorney to act as corporate gatekeeper is not the best way to solve corporate
governance problems).
159 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2000).
160 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Exchange
Act Release No. 33-8186, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (proposed Feb. 6, 2003).
161 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT: REVIEW OF
REPORTING UNDER SECTION 10A at 1 (Sept. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.house.gov/commerce-democrats/press/gao92303.pdf (last accessed Mar. 12,
2004). The SEC has also brought seven enforcement actions over this same interval against
auditors for violations of section 10A. Id. This may also suggest that the SEC is slow to
bring enforcement proceedings against professional firms (and would remain similarly
reluctant to enforce a "noisy withdrawal" rule against attorneys).
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professional role that the client has invited. Otherwise, the attorney is risking
professional disaster and will predictably resist.
A serious strategy for converting the attorney into a gatekeeper must also
address the tension between the roles of gatekeeper and advocate, possibly by
separating the two roles and encouraging firms to employ multiple counsel.
That is, the corporation could use different law firms, one to plan and structure
a transaction and the other to supervise disclosure. Obviously, this would
involve increased costs because duplicative work would be performed. Yet,
this is essentially what Sarbanes-Oxley did to the accountant, divorcing the
roles of auditor and consultant because of the clear conflict of interest. In any
event, such a separation need not be legally mandated in the case of the
attorney because it could be left to the corporation to decide if it felt
sufficiently threatened by an attorney who was under a legal obligation to
perform a gatekeeping function that it wished to hire multiple counsel. Firms
would not need to specialize in one or the other role, but ideally, a law firm
would not serve in both capacities to the same client.
Such a proposal is well in advance of where the SEC is today. To date, the
SEC has never articulated any general statement of the attorney's gatekeeper
role. Although section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizes the SEC to
promulgate minimum standards of professional conduct for securities
attorneys, the SEC has, to this point, addressed only the narrow but sensitive
context of the attorney's obligations when the attorney discovers a material
violation of law. It has made no broader attempt to provide any conceptual
overview of the attorney's overall responsibility to investors.1 62  Yet the
statutory authority to do so seems clearly contained in section 307. For
example, minimum standards of professional conduct could: (1) require the
attorney to perform reasonable due diligence with respect to the statements
made in disclosure documents that the attorney drafts for the corporate client;
(2) mandate standards of independence for attorneys performing certain
sensitive tasks incident to securities practice; and (3) subject the attorney to
professional discipline for negligence or malpractice, thus giving the SEC a
useful enforcement tool in cases where it suspects misconduct but cannot
easily prove scienter.
On the premise that securities attorneys should serve as gatekeepers for
investors, this article will make three specific proposals. First, the SEC should
adopt a limited certification requirement mandating that a securities attorney
acknowledge that it has reviewed the non-financial disclosure in publicly filed
reports; second, it should establish independence standards for securities
attorneys performing certain tasks that require them to be independent of
management, such as the conduct of internal corporate investigations for
162 See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 33-8185, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Jan. 29, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205)
(adopting final rule requiring "up the ladder" reporting by securities attorneys, but not
imposing additional steps, such as "noisy withdrawal").
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publicly held firms; and third, the SEC should deem negligence by attorneys in
the preparation of SEC disclosure documents to amount to unprofessional
conduct for which attorneys could be disciplined under the SEC's Rules of
Practice (just as auditors can be disciplined today). 163 Uniting these proposals
is the idea that the attorney should perform a due diligence investigation of the
corporation's non-financial disclosures that roughly corresponds to the
auditor's role with respect to financial disclosures.
1. A Negative Assurance Certification
A certification requirement applicable to attorneys can be justified simply
on the grounds of consistency. Today, a publicly-held corporation's CEO and
CFO must certify that each periodic report "fairly presents in all material
respects" the issuer's "financial condition and results of operations."'
64
Similarly, the securities analyst must also today certify that the analyst truly
agrees with his or her research advice to investors. 65  Thus, managers,
auditors, and analysts all certify their work, but the corporation's principal
counsel does not. Arguably, the attorney should not be able to escape a
corresponding obligation, particularly because the auditor takes no
responsibility for the textual portion of the disclosure document, which is
independent of the financial statements that the auditor certifies. In effect,
attorney certification mandates a parallel expert to review the non-financial
disclosures of the public corporation, but the attorney, as gatekeeper, would
not be asked to perform an audit or check facts in the manner that an auditor
does.
Specifically, the attorney principally responsible for preparing a document
or report filed with the SEC should certify: (1) that such attorney believes the
statements made in the document or report to be true and correct in all material
respects, and (2) that such attorney is not aware of any additional material
information whose disclosure is necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading. 166 The real thrust of this proposal is to require the issuer to subject
its principal disclosure documents to the scrutiny of an attorney who would be
163 See Rule 102(e)(1)(iv) of the SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(1)(iv)
(2004) (authorizing SEC to suspend or censure an accountant for "a single instance of
highly unreasonable conduct. .. [or] ... [r]epeated instances of unreasonable conduct").
164 See supra notes 125-129 and accompanying text (discussing certification
requirements under sections 302 and 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley).
165 See Regulation Analyst Certification, Securities Act Release No. 33-8193, 68 Fed.
Reg. 9482 (Apr. 14, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (adopting Regulation AC, which
requires a research analyst employed by a broker or dealer to certify that the views
expressed in the research report accurately reflect his or her personal views).
166 Issues could arise as to which the attorney was principally responsible for preparing a
document. The simplest answer to this issue is to require the corporation to disclose the
identity of such attorney in the filing and then require that attorney's certification.
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under a professional obligation to exercise a reasonable level of "due
diligence" in his or her review.' 67 Today, there is no barrier to the preparation
and filing of such non-financial documents entirely by non-professionals.
At first glance, this proposed certification simply tracks the language of
Rule lOb-5. Yet, the bar will object that by subjecting the attorney to the
requirement that the attorney exercise reasonable care, the attorney is being
subjected to unreasonable liability. In truth, however, this proposed obligation
would only generalize existing practices in the market because today, in most
public underwritten offerings, issuer's counsel does deliver an opinion to the
underwriters stating that it is not "aware" of any material information required
to be disclosed that has not been disclosed. 68 SEC rules would therefore
simply be requiring for 1934 Act periodic filings what is already done in the
primary market for 1933 Act disclosure documents; the real difference is that,
in the case of periodic filings under the Securities Exchange Act, there is no
analogue to the underwriter to demand such an opinion or certification from
the attorney. Thus, SEC action would fill this void. In addition, such a
requirement would have a profound symbolic and psychological effect on the
bar because it would recognize the attorney's obligations as a gatekeeper.
167 An additional question is whether such review should be by an attorney
"independent" of management-a term that additional SEC rules could define. Although
the case for requiring an "independent" attorney is obvious, even if the corporation's general
counsel were permitted to provide this certification, there would still be value to this
proposal because the obligation to certify might offset other pressures on such counsel.
168 For a description of this standard opinion in registered public offerings, see Richard
R. Howe, The Duties and Liabilities of Attorneys in Rendering Legal Opinions, 1989
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 283, 287. The author of the article, a partner at the New York firm of
Sullivan & Cromwell, properly observes, "such opinions are not really 'legal opinions' at all
in that they do not state any legal conclusion but only say that the attorney believes certain
facts to be true." Id. Precisely for this reason, such an opinion is more a pledge of the law
firm's reputational capital, which the underwriters demand. The counsel giving such
opinion does not purport to conclude that all information required to be disclosed has been
disclosed (as an auditor might by analogy), but only that it lacks personal knowledge or
belief as to any such failure. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 291 (1984) (also describing such
opinions); Richard W. Painter, Toward A Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search
of Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 221, 226-27 & n.19 (1995)
(discussing judicial interpretation of such opinions). The American Bar Association has
characterized this type of opinion as a "negative assurance" and finds such opinions to be
"unique to securities offerings." See ABA Comm. on Legal Opinions, Third-Party Legal
Opinion Report, Including the Legal Opinion Accord of the Section of Business Law,
American Bar Association, 47 Bus. LAW. 167, 228 (1991). Although the ABA considers it
generally inappropriate for attorneys to request such "negative assurance" opinions from
other attorneys, the special context of securities offerings is exempted, reflecting the fact
that underwriters consider such an assurance to be necessary to them. That the ABA, as the
representative of the bar, "disfavors" such opinions, because of the demands they place on
the attorney, probably only underscores the value of such a reform.
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Ideally, the SEC should go even further and require the attorney to certify that
the attorney so believed "after making such inquiry that the attorney
reasonably believed appropriate in the circumstances"; this would establish at
least a minimal due diligence obligation. To be sure, this is a far cry from the
strict liability that the auditor would face, but it is a meaningful enhancement
designed to elicit greater precaution from, and investigation by, attorneys.
Indeed, law firms would likely agree to provide such certification only if they
could maintain a continuing oversight of the firm; one-time-only certifications
would be a service that few firms would dare, or be economically motivated, to
provide.
Admittedly, limits need to be recognized on what an attorney can certify.
Because the attorney does not audit its client, the attorney should not be asked
to certify the accuracy and completeness of all information disclosed in SEC
filings; nor should it be asked to investigate the financial statements that the
auditor certifies (although the attorney should be required to certify his or her
belief that these statements contain no material misrepresentations or
omissions). 169  Thus, the proposal made here requires only a negative
certification that the attorney had no reason to believe, and did not believe, that
the information was materially false or misleading. Legally, such a
certification would trigger "aiding and abetting" liability if the attorney was
aware of materially false or misleading information, and it could even trigger
criminal liability under various federal statutes. But its primary effect is to
recognize that the securities attorney is a gatekeeper for investors.
2. Independence
Auditors, of course, must be independent of their client, and SEC rules have
long defined tests for auditor independence. Increasingly, a new literature has
warned that attorneys are becoming too economically interconnected with their
client to exercise independent judgment as the result, in part, of the increasing
practice of law firms taking (and even demanding) equity stakes in the client in
return for professional services. 170 If some level of independence is necessary
for an attorney to function as a gatekeeper, SEC rules of professional conduct
could define these limits. To illustrate, a law firm that holds in its portfolio ten
percent of the corporate client's equity (or, alternatively, equity in the client
equal to ten percent of its own net asset value) will probably be a poor, or at
least a biased, monitor.
169 The attorney thus would not be required to certify that it exercised reasonable care or
otherwise investigated the financial statements.
170 See Royce De R. Barondes, Professionalism Consequences of Law Firm Investments
In Clients: An Empirical Assessment, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 379 (2002) (hypothesizing that law
firms that invest in their clients create conflicts of interest); John S. Dzienkowski & Robert
J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence: Lawyer Equity Investments in Clients, 81
TEX. L. REv. 405 (2002) (critiquing the practice of accepting equity in exchange for legal
services).
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In any event, the context that is most sensitive and would most benefit from
such rules is that of internal corporate investigations. Often, such
investigations are mandated by the SEC, and typically, the resulting reports are
filed with the SEC. Should the corporation's normal outside counsel perform
such an investigation? Or, should SEC rules define the level of independence
necessary to conduct such a more sensitive inquiry? Absent SEC action,
individual state bar associations will either do nothing (the most likely
outcome) or prescribe different and inconsistent standards, thereby creating
needless disparities. Uniform standards for corporate internal investigations
are desirable and, as a practical matter, can only come from the SEC. There is
no need to offer precise rules here but only to recognize that professionals are
expected to be independent of their clients. Accordingly, the SEC should read
section 307 to grant it authority to define the point at which the attorney is not
sufficiently independent of the client to perform certain sensitive tasks.
3. The Due Diligence Obligation
Certification is only a first step. The next logical step would be to mandate
due diligence by the attorney in preparing or reviewing SEC filings as a
minimum standard of professional conduct. Here, Sarbanes-Oxley changes the
picture significantly because section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley authorizes the
SEC to establish "minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys
appearing and practicing before the Commission.. . " This reference to
"professional conduct" would certainly seem to empower the SEC to adopt
rules requiring the attorney both to conduct a minimal due diligence review
before the attorney files a document or report with the SEC and to certify its
good faith belief in the accuracy of the statements made therein. Indeed, in its
existing Rules of Practice, the SEC already holds auditors to precisely such a
standard and asserts the power to suspend or disbar them for merely negligent
conduct. 17' If this can be done without special statutory authority, then it
seems to follow a fortiori, after the enactment of section 307, that the SEC
could require attorneys to take reasonable steps to investigate the accuracy of
statements made in documents that they prepare. 172
The bottom line then is that the SEC is today empowered to adopt rules that
could suspend or disbar an attorney for negligence as a form of professional
misconduct. Negligence would clearly not support a private cause of action
under Rule 1Ob-5, but it may be the appropriate standard for the imposition of
171 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e)(iv) (2004) (specifying that two forms of "negligent
conduct"-either "[a] single instance of highly unreasonable conduct" or "[r]epeated
instances of unreasonable conduct"--could trigger sanctions under Rule 102(e)).
172 The attorney would, of course, be entitled to rely on the auditor with respect to
financial information certified by the auditor, as in the case of the "reliance on an expert"
defense under section 11(b)(3)(c) of the Securities Act of 1933. See 15 U.S.C. §
77(k)(b)(3)(C) (2000).
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sanctions under section 307.173 Such a tradeoff-i.e., public liability but not
private liability for negligence-again seems desirable in that it enhances
deterrence without threatening insolvency for law firms.
D. Accessing Counter-Arguments: Can Attorneys Be Gatekeepers?
Any assertion that the SEC should compel the securities attorney to play a
greater gatekeeping role inevitably runs into the argument that such a role is
either inappropriate for attorneys or will reduce their clients' willingness to
confide in them. The first claim that such a role is inappropriate depends
largely on one's vantage point. Litigators tend to view the attorney's role
narrowly as that of an advocate for, and protector of, the client-a bulwark
between the client and an oppressive state. 17 4 Securities attorneys are less
ready to buy into this rhetoric, however, and generally do not have the same
self-image of themselves. For the most part, they agree that they have at least
an ethical responsibility to perform due diligence on documents they draft and
file with the SEC. For over a quarter century, prominent securities attorneys
have recognized that, as a result, their professional role is closer to that of the
auditor than to that of the litigator. 175 The key elements that distinguish the
173 Historically, the SEC did once hold attorneys liable for professional negligence in
"aiding and abetting" cases. See SEC v. Spectrum Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536, 542 (2d Cir.
1973). This is no longer possible after the Supreme Court mandated a scienter standard in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), but sanctions for professional
misconduct could look to a similar standard.
174 Evans A. Davis, The Meaning of Professional Independence, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1289 (2003) (arguing that the SEC's up-the-ladder reporting rules inhibit professional
independence).
175 The literature here is enormous, but one brief statement by a securities lawyer of
iconic reputation stands out. In 1974, A.A. Sommer, Jr., then an SEC Commissioner, gave a
now famous and oft-quoted address in which he initially described the securities attorney
not as an advocate, but rather as "the field marshall who coordinate[s] the activities of others
engaged in the registration process." A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of
the Securities Lawyer, Address to the Banking, Corporation & Business Law Section, N.Y.
State Bar Ass'n (Jan. 24, 1974), reprinted in LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA GABALDON,
SECURITIES REGULATION 617 (4th ed. 1999). Then, based on his description of the attorney
as more a transaction engineer than an advocate, he offered his normative assessment:
I would suggest that in securities matters (other than those where advocacy is clearly
proper) the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of auditor than
to that of the attorney. This means several things. It means that he will have to
exercise a measure of independence that is perhaps uncomfortable if he is also the close
counselor of management in other matters, often including business decisions. It
means he will have to be acutely cognizant of his responsibility to the public who
engage in securities transactions that would never have come about were it not for his
professional presence. It means that he will have to adopt the healthy skepticism
toward the representation of management which a good auditor must adopt. It means
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attorney as advocate from the attorney as gatekeeper are: (1) a need for greater
independence from the client; (2) a recognition of a duty to the public; and (3)
professional skepticism. 76 Exactly these differences need to be recognized by
the SEC under section 307.
The more important counterargument to imposing gatekeeper obligations on
securities attorneys is.that attorneys will be unable to communicate as freely
with their clients if gatekeeper obligations or "noisy withdrawal" requirements
are imposed. In response to this claim, it is first necessary to recognize that the
ultimate goal of the law is to achieve law compliance, not to maximize
uninhibited communications between the attorney and the client.177 The norm
of client confidentiality is a means to an end, not the end in itself.
Still, even with this concession, it remains true that lawyers can counsel
most effectively when there is open, relatively, unconstrained communication
between their clients and themselves. Hence, the practical issue becomes
whether gatekeeper obligations would necessary chill desirable attorney-client
communications. Here, two arguments need to be considered.
First, lawyer-client relationships are less likely to be chilled if corporate
clients use the gatekeeping attorney as a specialist, employing one attorney to
consult on the transaction and another to review and prepare the disclosures.
This may be duplicative, but it is essentially the same duplication that exists
between the in-house bookkeeper and the outside auditor. Indeed, because the
gatekeeper could prepare the disclosure document, there would not be
complete duplication, as there is in the case of financial statements. In
addition, specialization by attorneys as gatekeepers also mitigates the "one
client practice" problem that challenges all professional service firms, auditors
as well as attorneys. A professional with a single dominating client has an
incentive to subordinate his own firm's interest in preserving its reputation to
his client's demands for acquiescence. But gatekeepers, as specialists, would
typically serve multiple clients and hence would be less dominated. Law firms
could specialize in this role or, more likely, service some clients as gatekeepers
Although Commissioner Sommer never used the term "noisy withdrawal" in this speech,
the same concept seems to have been, more or less, on his mind, and the elements that he
does specifically enunciate-high independence, duty to public investors, professional
skepticism-are probably the key elements that distinguish the attorney as advocate from
the attorney as gatekeeper.
176 See id. at 618-19.
177 Thus, the "crime/fraud" exception to the attorney-client privilege makes some
communications between attorney and client discoverable, even though this result thereby
arguably makes clients less ready to confide in their attorneys. The justification for this
result, which applies similarly to this context, is that communications so excluded from the
privilege are deemed socially undesirable. For the current status of this exception, see In re
Richard Roe, Inc., 168 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1999). See also David N. Zornow & Keith Krakaur,
On the Brink of a Brave New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal
Investigations, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 147 (2000) (suggesting that the attorney/client
privilege is already highly qualified in this context).
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and others as transactional engineers.
A second response to the claim that attorney-client communication will be
chilled is to focus both on when such communications are most desirable and
least desirable. A plausible case can be made that a "noisy withdrawal" rule
threatens primarily the least desirable communications. The starting point for
this analysis is the recognition that.the typical client knows little law and will
almost always want to know if contemplated action is illegal. From this
premise, it follows that the corporate official contemplating prospective action
will still inquire of counsel whether the course of action under consideration is
lawful. Indeed, the more the government pursues white collar criminal
prosecutions and punitive regulatory actions in the contemporary post-Enron
environment, the more, in turn, that corporate officers are likely to inquire
before they act. When then will communications most likely be chilled? The
logical answer is that the officer who has already acted may fear inquiring of
an attorney if the officer's conduct was lawful-precisely because the officer
fears that the attorney may be under an obligation to report unlawful actions to
higher authorities or, indirectly, to the SEC. In short, it is the ex post inquiry
by the client of the attorney that is most likely to be chilled.
If one accepts this premise that ex ante communications between counsel
and the client are less likely to be chilled than ex post communications, several
implications follow. First, the impact of imposing gatekeeper obligations on
attorneys may be socially desirable. In a well-known article, Professors
Kaplow and Shavell have argued that the case for protecting ex ante
communications between attorneys and clients is far stronger than the case for
protecting ex post communications. 178 Advice before action leads individuals
to comply with the law, they argue, whereas ex post advice does not provide a
guide for action and may simply allow the defendant to reduce the expected
penalty costs, thus encouraging illegality. It is not necessary to fully accept the
Kaplow-Shavell analysis to see that its core distinction between ex ante and ex
post advice suggests that we should be more concerned about chilling ex ante
communications between attorney and client. But this is not what most
gatekeeper obligations do; rather, they may induce such ex ante
communications by making ex post advice less possible.
Second, requiring "noisy withdrawals" and "up-the-ladder" reporting also
has a deterrent value that is independent of this issue of whether the initial
corporate actor will still consult counsel. Few significant actions within a
corporation can be taken by a single actor. Decisions made by one person still
need to be implemented by others. Thus, even after the initial corporate actor
has taken an irrevocable step (and will thereafter be arguably less willing to
consult with counsel ex post), other corporate actors will need to be contracted
178 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present in
Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REv. 565, 597 (1989)
(describing ex ante legal advice as a socially beneficial tool); see also Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1477, 1531-33 (1999).
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and convinced to cooperate with the initial actor. They will have every
incentive to consult with counsel because they are still at the ex ante stage. In
turn, knowledge that others are necessarily likely to learn of the original actor's
conduct and to consult with counsel about its legality may deter the original
actor. The modem public corporation is embedded with in-house attorneys,
and even the possibility that they will report "up the ladder" should deter some
illegal conduct. Hence, even if under some conditions there may be less direct
communication between corporate actors and counsel, knowledge that sooner
or later counsel is likely to learn ex post can still deter corporate actors ex ante.
As a result, the principal practical effect that imposing gatekeeper
obligations will have on clients is that a client who has been advised by an
attorney that contemplated action is unlawful now has greater reason to heed
that attorney's advice-again precisely to the extent that the client believes that
the attorney may be under a legal obligation to report any misconduct (either
inside the corporation or outside). Thus, even if it were true that clients would
consult less, this impact could be more than fully offset by the fact that it
would become more dangerous to disregard the lawyer's advice. Add to this
mix the likelihood that ex ante advice will not be chilled, and the net impact is
to increase the attorney's leverage over the client by making it more dangerous
to ignore the attorney's advice. If law compliance is the goal, such an impact
seems socially desirable.
CONCLUSION
The diagnosis of "gatekeeper failure" made in Part I of this article leads
naturally to a multi-part prescription for law compliance: the law should create,
empower, and deter gatekeepers. Deterrence is easy, but it can be overdone.
Thus, although this article has favored a shift towards stricter liability, it has
coupled this recommendation with a proposed ceiling on liability set at the
level necessary to deter the gatekeeper. This proposal may subordinate
compensation to deterrence-but only with regard to litigation against
gatekeepers, who are seldom in any event in a position to fund full
compensation to the investor class.
Empowerment is a trickier question. If we are to reduce accounting and
financial reporting irregularities, the optimal strategy must both motivate and
empower gatekeepers to insist upon law compliance. In the case of the
attorney, the first step toward making the securities attorney a gatekeeper
should be to enhance their leverage over their clients in order to enable them to
exert greater pressure for law compliance. A mandatory attorney certification
standard, enforced by a due diligence obligation, does essentially this by
forcing the client to seek the attorney's review. The end goal of these reforms
should be to encourage the emergence of a new specialist: the
lawyer/gatekeeper, who would practice alongside and not in conflict with the
lawyer/advocate and the lawyer/transaction engineer.
Gatekeeper empowerment necessarily requires intruding upon our existing
guild-like structure of private self-regulation of the professions. Sarbanes-
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Oxley already does this in the case of the accounting and analyst professions,
but the SEC has not yet compelled the legal profession to recognize its
mandatory obligations to the public. Professions, like guilds, will predictably
resist any increase in their responsibilities and liabilities to the public, but, as
the accounting profession has already found, the professional cannot remain
aloof and self-governing once the social cost of gatekeeper failure has become
apparent.
